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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, a corporation; KENNECOTT
COMMUNICATIONS CORPORA'l'ION, BEAR CREEK MINING COMP ANY, a corporation; KENNECOTT
COAL COMP ANY, a corporation;
CHASE BRASS AND COPPER COMP ANY, INC., a corporation; PEABODY
COAL COMPANY (formerly
JOJNBODY, INC.), a corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
Defendant.

Case No.
12498

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 1, 1970, the State Tax Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Tax Commission" or the
''Commission", through its auditing division, proposed
a deficiency assessnwnt against Kt-nnecott Copper Corporation and its Affiliated Corporations, hereinafter
calh'd "Kennecott", in the amonnt of 2,444,101.G2. This
dPficiency assessment covered the taxable years 1967
anu l9GS and was based on a determination by the Tax
Commission that Kennecott's consolidated returns did not
fairly
the pxtPnt of its hnsi1wss activity in Utah.
Kennecott promptly filed a request for redetermination,

and tlw matter eamt- 011 n•gnlarly for ht-aring lwfon·
the Commission on N ovcmber 23 and N ovembPr 24, 1970.
It is sti1mlated that tliP prineipl<• <·ontp:;t1·d issne:; of lcnr
are:
1. ·whetlwr or not Kennecott's consolidatc>cl tax

returns, as filed, fairl.\- represent the extent of its hnsint>ss aetivity in the State• of Ftah.

2. ·whether or not the audit deficiency proposed by
the 'l'ax Commission, as modified, fairly allocates the
tax
of Kennecott to the State of Utah.
:3. '\Vht>tlwr or not Kennecott is entitled to rely
on Federal Tax Regulations in allocating deductions for
Federal Income Tax to Utah or whether Tax Commission Regulation No. 13 is controlling in this respect.
4. What is the proper method under Utah Law for
eomputing the
deduction for depletion.

Jn addition, certain other issues were raised in the
pleadings and hearing below and are now asserted by
Kennecott by way of appeal. These include:
5. Kennecott's claim that the Commission denied
it the right to file a consolidated return.
6. ·whether the Commission's failure to waive mterest on the prt>sc•nt
assessment constitutes
an abuse of discretion.

Further questions 11ot raised below are set forth
by KPnnecott for the first time before this court. They
are:

')

•J

7. The validity of Tax Commission Regulation 13.
8. The claim that the Commission's deficiency
assessment violates the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
specifically in that the deficiency assessment subjects
KPnnecott to double taxation.
In view of the stipulation of the parties regarding
the principal contested issues of law and because the
Commission believes that Kennecott's brief avoids these
issues or presents them in an order which is misleading
and is predicated and grounded on propositions which
are legally unsound, the Tax Commission will respond
to Plaintiffs' brief in the order and manner set forth
above.

DISPOSITION BEFORE THE TAX COMMISSION
As a result of the aforesaid hearing, the Tax Commission issued a decision on April 5, 1971 (R. 672-691)
wherein the original deficiency assessment as proposed
by its auditing division was modified and sustained,
resulting in a deficiency assessment against Kennecott
in the amount of $2,313,507.72, together with interest at
the rate of 6 per cent per annum from and after May
15, 1971.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the decision of the Tax
Commission to the extent it is contrary to law or unsupported by facts.
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Defendant reqnests that tlw Comt Sl'stain it,'; <l:''.':sion and in addition sustain Tax Commission Regnlation
in the event the question of its validity is deemed
properly before this Court.
In addition, Defendant requests that the Court rule
that the issue of double taxation as raised by Plaintiffs'
brief is not properl:-- before the Conrt.
STA'rEMENT OF FACTS

A. ThP Na.titre of the Taxpayer
The Plaintiffs herein are Kennecott Copper Corporation and certain wholly owned subsidiaries, all of
which are duly qualified under the laws of the State
of Utah to engage in business in this State and to here
acqmre, own and possess real and personal
(R. 40).
Kennecott is basically a mmmg company, and at
all times herein pertinent was, and now is, the owner
of and operating certain mines, mining claims, mining
properties, leaching and precipitating plants, pipelines,
transportation systems, milling and smelting and reduction works in the State of Utah and elsewhere. It owns
and operates mining properties in the State of Utah,
New Mexico, Arizona and Nevada and is there engaged
in the production of copper and other metals (R. 43-44).

For some years, Kennecott has followed a divisional
method of accounting for its various operations. One
of its divisions is the Utah Copper Division, cowring
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the mining, processing and ultimate sale of the products
originating from Utah. The annual report to stockholders includes a statement of the accounts of Kennecott Copper Corporation and its subsidiaries, presented
on a consolidated basis. This statement represents a
consolidation of the accounts of these corporations prepared in accord with generally acct•pted accounting
methods, based on the accounts of the several corporations whose accounts are thus consolidated but subject
to the elimination of inter-company items and other
adjustments appropriate to the preparation of such a
consolidated statement (R. 169-175) (R. 675).
rrhe general books and accounts of the Kennecott
Copper Corporation are kept at its principal office in
New York City. Subsidiary books of account are kept at
each divisional office. The subsidiary books and accounts
at each of these divisions show the accounting for the
assets and liabilities and the operations and income of
that division. The general books of account carry the
appropriate control accounts ·with respect to the subsidiary accounts, as kept at each of the divisions, in accord
,,·ith well established accounting procedures (R. 173).
Any sales of mineral products made by Kennecott
('op:wr Corporation to its fabricating subsidiaries, and
any purchases made by Kennecott Copper Corporation
of the products of its subsidiaries, are made between
the corporations on an arms length basis at the same
prices as are charged to others. To the extent that Kenneeott Conppr Corporation receives dividends from any

G

of its sul:i'sidiaries, these are taken up in the accounts of
the Kennecott Copper Corporation as dividend receipts.
An>- otht1r items of inter-company charges and receipts
are likewise booked and accounted for as between separate corporations. Accordingly, the books and accounts
of Kennecott Copper Corportion give the separate
accounting for its operations and affairs as distinguished
from the operations and affairs of its separate subsidiary or related corporations (R. 170-171).
The system followed with respect to the accounts
of the Utah Copper Division is the same as is followed
for the other divisions of Kennecott Copper Corporation.
Again, there is separate accounting of the affairs of each
of thl•se divisions. rrhe accounts of each division according!;; show the income arising from the sale of the
products of the mines of that division (and any other
income from the operations of that division) and the
costs applicable thereto, without regard as to whether
sales or costs are within or without the state where the
mines are located and without regard to any other state
bonndries (R. 173-174).
There is complete separation of accounts between
Kennecott Copper Corporation and its several subsidiaries. E.ach has its own separate books of account which
in no way merge with, or are dependent upon, the
accounts of Kennecott Copper Corporation (R. 172).
Within the Kennecott Copper Corporation, there
are separate sets of books kept at the various divisions
in the New York Office, which, however, are compli-
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mentary or supplementary one to the other and do have
an interlocking through respective control accounts.
There is, therefore, a relationship between the accounts
of Kennecott Copper Corporation for its several divisions which does not exist as to Kennecott Copper Corporation and its subsidiaries (R. 176-177).
The operating expenses of the Utah Division are
separately identified and can be segregated from the
expenses of other divisions. General and administrative
overhead is allocated among the divisions. There are
separate accounts maintained for the Utah Division
which properly reflect the income from Utah operations
only, but as a part of Kennecott's Metal Mines Division
(R. 179).
There are two reasons for maintaining separate
accounts for the Utah Division. The first is in order
to be able to compute the depletion deduction for State
and Federal Tax Purposes. The primary reason, however, is for management information, so that the officers
of Kennecott can ascertain how the various divisions are
doing on a competitive basis, as compared to prior periods (R. 132-133) (R. 105) (R. 203-201)
Notwithstanding the foregoing, there are strong
vertical relationships between Kennecott Copper Corporation and its operating divisions and subsidiaries in
the areas of fiscal controls, accounting controls, tax
policies, purchasing, job evaluation, negotiation with
unions, management development, salary administration,
recruiting, promotions, insurance benefits, advertising,

8

legal S<'lTices, anditing, planning [Jnc1
(':@mnnications, financing analysis, sales, warehousing,
accounting, charitablP contributions and scholarships
(R. 117-165) (Ex. H).
There are also horizontal inter-n•lationships between
the various operating properties within the company,
such as Chino, New Mexico, The Ray Mines in Arizona,
the Nevada Mine, the Tintic Division and the Utah
Division (R. 162).
J{ennecott conknds, and the Commis8ion has agreed,
that from the nature of the horizontal and vertical
inter-relation8hips set forth above, it is a unitary operation (R. 687).
Notwithstanding this, it is capable of accounting for
the income of its various divisions separately. Kennecott filed a report of the income of its Ray 1\1ines Division with the State of Arizona on a separate accounting
basis in the years 1967 and 1968 ( R. 200-201).
Kennecott has further claimed not to be nnitary
\Yi th its subsidiaries on other occasions; i.e., see Chase
Brnss CozJpcr Co. L Franchise Tax Board, 7 Cal. App.
3d 9!), 8(i Cal. Rptr. 350, Rehearing denied 10 Cal. AIJp.
3rd 49G, 87 Cal. Hptr. 239, Cert. denied 27 L.Ed 2d 381
(R. 198-200).

«

K0nnecott is snhject to the jurisdiction of other
taxing states bnt does not pay taxes on more than 100 per
cent of its incomC' (R 74, 8G, G92).

B. K cnnccott's Bitsincss Activity
Kennecott did not file consolidated returns in the
)'Par 1966 (Ex. P). For the years 1962 through 1966,
the pan'nt corporation, Kennecott Copper Corporation,
filed its tax returns imrsuant to an agreement with the
Tax Commission dated January 31, 1962. In its 1966
tax return, the taxpayer assigned to Utah as net income
assignahle from business done in this state the amount
of $32,G30,575.36. In the year l96G, the Kennecott Copper Coq1oration reported total tangible property in Utah
of $153,703,625.47. It reported total expenditures for
wages and payroll in Utah of $58,011,317.32. It further
reported gross recei11ts and saks in Utah of $17,196,314.19
(Ex. P) (R. 658-669).
During the taxable years m question, Kennecott
reported, among other things, the following indicia of
husiness actiyity on its consolidated returns :1
1967
Gross Receipts ____________________________________ $448,994,805.62
Cost of Goods Sold -·--··-···-··-·-·-··-··--·-279,681,388.12
Gross Profit ··-----··--··--·--····-·-··-·--···-··-··
169,313.417.50
Taxes . ---·--··--·--··--·--·---·-·---·-·-··-··--·--·--·--29,360,617.10
Depreciation ·-·····--·····-···-·-·-·--··--····-·····
32,157,955.32
Depletion ·-·-···········--···············--···-··---···
16,067,738.85
Total All Income ·--···············-··-·····--···
196,669,909.81
Total All Deductions ··-·········-··-······-·
156,801,435.90
Net Income ______ . ····-·····-······-···········-39,868,473.91
Net Income Assignable to Utah .... -(645,102.31

1968
$715,674,812.61
476,802,890.52
238,871,922.09
56,244,424.91
37.187,694.87
32,044,243.47
286,189,663.30
207,858,135.37
78,331,527.93
7,763, 163.36

In addition, it reported the following items in its tax
returns for the purpose of allocation and apportionment
lSee C:r,soli<lated Returns for 1967 and 1968 (R. 420-553, 679).
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of income under the Uniform Division of Income for
Tax Purposes Act :2
In Utah
Total Tangible Properly in 1967 .... $329,428,667.70
Total Tangible Property jn 1968 .... 359,137,292.71
44,142,556.24
1967 Payroll ···········-···························
1968 Payroll ........................................ 55,396,136.34
3,308,738.42
1967 Receipts and Sales ................
3,701,583.78
1968 Receipts and Sales ................

In and Out of Utah
$ 775,807,391.97
1,007,313,895.65
102,926,954.90
166,040,056.94
397,937 ,486. 78
650,966,525. 70

During the year 1967 for purposes of its depletion
computation, Kennecott reported gross sales from its
Utah Division of $158,268,903.91 (R. 466). From this,
it dPdncted certain post mining co:shi, selling Pxpenses
and other expenses and losses, resulting in a reportable
income for dPrilPtion pnrpose::; from the Utah Divi:sion
of $ll7,44:),49G.51 (R. 4GG). For purposes of its depletion compntation, it then deducted mining and concentrating exppnses in the amount of $84,053,052.82, resultig in a reportable taxable income from its property in
Utah, for depletion purposes, of $33,380,443.69 (R. 466)
(Ex. A).
Similarlv m 1968, Kennecott, for purposes of its
internal computation of depletion, reported as gross sales
from its Utah Division $201,450,760.93, from which it
deducted post mining and concentrating costs of $48,139,578.95, resulting in $153,311,181.98 as gross income
from the property. From this figure, mining and concentrating costs in the amount of $95,474,478.90 were
deducted, resulting in a reportable taxable income from
zSee Consolidated Returns for 1967 and 1968 (R. 420-553, 679).
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the property in Utah for purposes of the depletion
computation of $58,178,300.70 (Ex. B) (R. 525).
Kennecott is one of the largest industrial concerns
of the nation. Its Utah Division Smelter near Magna
is one of the largest copper smelters in the world
(R. 192). The Utah mine has produced more copper
than any other mining company in history (Ex. 0, p. 2).
Kennecott, in 1964, was the world's second largest
producer of copper and molybdenum and the Western
Hemisphere's second largest producer of gold. Its total
annual revenues are large. For example, in combination
with other subsidiaries not included in the Utah tax
return, it reported the following financial information
to its stockholders, by means of its annual reports :3
1967

Total Revenue ···-·······················
$542,321,000.00
Cost of Goods Sold ···········-·······278,944,000.00
Net Income···-······-············-·······77,022,000.00

1968

$768,778,000.00
446,040,000.00
111,220,000.00

Since December 31, 1966, when a three-year program to expand copper production in Utah was completed, the Utah Mine has had a capability of producing
in excess of 300,000 tons of copper annually. This
amounts to an estimated 25 per cent of the nation's
primary production and 5 per cent of the reported copper
production of the free world (R. 254). Of the 616,700
tons of copper sold by Kennecott and all of its affiliates
in 1966, 240,779 tons were produced in Utah (Ex. K, p.
4, 5) (R. 653).
aSee Exhibit L, p. 1; Ex. M, p. 1.

Kennecott m1d its affih1:c's withi11 and witLor:t Pt::1!1
employ in excess of 20,000 employees each year. Average
employment at the Utah Copper Division fluctuates at
around 7,700 (R. 657) (Ex. 0, p. 6) (R. 652) (Ex. L.
M, N).
In the year 1968, the total domestic copper production of Kennecott was 378,215 tons (Ex. N, p. 14) (R.
656). Of this amount, the Utah Copper Division produced 203,198 tons or 53.72 per cent (Ex. N, p. 15). In
the same year, Kennecott and all of its affiliates mined,
milled and treated a total of 47,249,069 tons of ore, of
which the Utah Copper Division accounted for 28,343,900
tons or 59.8 per cent (Ex. N, p. 14, 15) (R. 656).
C. The Consolidated Returns

During the years 1967 and 1968, Kennecott and its
affiliates; namely, Chase Brass and Copper Company,
Incorporated, Bear Creek Mining Company, Kennecott
Communications Corporation, Kennecott Coal Company
and Peabody Coal Company (formerly Kenbody, Inc.)
were and now are corporations incorporated under the
laws of the following respective states: Kennecott Copper Corporation - New York; Chase Brass and Copper
Company, Incorporated - Connecticut; Bear Creek Mining Company and Peabody Coal Company - Delaware;
Kennecott Coal Company and Kennecott Communications Corporation - Utah (R. 40).
At all times pertinent to this review, Kennecott
and its above-named affiliates were and now are cor-
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porations qualified under the laws of the State of Utah
to engage in business in the State and therein to acquire,
own, and possess real and personal property. The stocks
of the above-named affiliates were in the taxable years
1967 and 1968 and are now wholly owned by Kennecott
(R. 41).
Kennecott Copper Corporation did not file consolidated returns in the years 1962 through 1966. However,
consolidated returns for the years 1942 to 1948, inclusive,
between Kennecott and its wholly owned subsidiary,
tlie Bingham and Garfield Railway Company, were filed
and before the Utah Supreme Court in the case of
Kennecott Copper Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 5 Utah 2d 306, 301 P.2d 562 (R. 678).
In 1967, Kennecott reported for purposes of its consolidated corporation franchise tax return an apportionment fraction, the numerator of which was $329,428,667. 70 and the denominator of which was $775,807,391.97,
with a resulting apportionment fraction showing that
42.46269 per cent of its tangible property was located
in the State of Utah (R. 435). In 1968, the property
fraction included a numerator of $359,137,292.71 and a
denominator of $1,007,313,895.65, resulting in an apportionment fraction of 35.65297 per cent of Kennecott's
total tangible property in Utah (R. 494).
In 1967, Kennecott, in accordance with Section 5913-90, U.C.A., 1953, apportioned its payroll in accordance with a fraction, the numerator of which was total
compensRtion paid in this state and the denominator of

'vhieh was total comp011sation paid in this state and

the denominator of which was total compensation paid
everywhere. The resulting fraction showed a numerator
in 19G7 of $44,142,55G.24 and dt>nominator of
954.90 for an apportionment fraction of 42.88727 per
cent of the total payroll of Kennecott in Utah (R. 435).
In 1968, the numerator of the fraction disclosed $55,396,136.34 paid in Utah as compared with $166,040,056.94
paid everywhere for an apportionment fraction of
33.36312 per cent of the total payroll of Kennecott
attributable to its Utah Division (R. 494).
With respect to gross receipts and sales, Kennecott
did not include gross receipts from sales of tangible
personal property produced in Utah in the numerator
of the sales factor fraction if the property sold was
shipp€d or delivered to purchasers outside of the state.
It allocated to the numerator of the sales fraction,
$3,308,738.42 for 1967 gross receipts and sales and as
a denominator, reported $397,937,486.78, resulting in an
apportionment fraction of .83147 per cent of its gross
receipts attributable to Utah (R. 435). In 1968, the
same fraction revealed a numerator of $3,701,583.78 and
a denominator of $650,966,525.70, for an apportionment
fraction of .56863 per cent of its total gross receipts
attributable to its Utah operations (R. 494).
However, for purposes of computing and claiming
a depletion allowance on its consolidated return, Kennecott reported 1967 gross sales from its Utah Division
of $158,268,903.91 (R. 466). In 1968, it reported gross
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sales of $201,450,760.93. Based upon Kennecott's own
figures, it appears that in 1967 approximately 39.77 per
cent of its gross sales resulted from its Utah operations
and that approximately 30.94 per cent of said sales
resulted from its 1968 Utah operations (R. 525).
Kennecott's actual gross receipts from its Utah
operations are much greater than are reported in its
computation of the sales factor fractions. This is because Section 59-13-92, U.C.A., 1953, includes in the numerator of the fraction "sales of the taxpayer in this
state." The Utah Act is silent with regard to whether
sales shipped to a purchaser outside the state are deemed
to be "in this State" even though the Model Act would
require such sales to be included in the numerator of
the fraction if the taxpayer "is not taxable in the state
of the purchaser" (R. 681).
Kennecott reported as net income on its 1967 franchise tax return the sum of $39,868,473.91 (R. 420).
On its 1968 return, it reported net income of $78,331,527 .93 (R. 488).
On its 1967 franchise tax return, for purposes of
computing depletion, Kennecott reported the sum of
$33,380,443.69 as taxable income from its Utah mining
property, before federal taxes and other allowable deductions (R. 466). In addition, it reported $3,061,389.69
as profit on smelting or refining activities (R. 466).'
On its 1968 franchise tax return, Kennecott similarly
reported $58,178,300.70 as taxable income from its Utah
property, before taxes and other deductions, together
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with a refining profit of $3,780,!.JIG.Gl (R.
Notwithstanding the foregoing income figures from
Kennecott's own returns, it a:ssigned to Utah on its
consolidated returns as net income attributable to husiness done in Utah in the year 1967 the sum of $4,645,102.31 (R. 420). In 1968, it assigned to Utah the sum
of $7,763,163.36 as income attributable to business done
in Utah for the purposP of Utah franchise taxation
(R. 488).

D. The Consolidated Retitrns' Treatment of Depletion
The figures used in Kennecott's consolidated returns
and its reported net income from mining properties as
also used in its federal return for computation of depletion, including the figures allocated to profit and cost
of post mining activities, are not in dispute. The Commission, however, disputes Kennecott's method of utilizing such figures for purposes of computing the, depletion
allowance and the allocated federal tax deduction.
It has been stipulated by the parties that depletion
is to be defined as heretofore construed by the Utah
Supreme Court. One of the definitions adopted by the
Court for depletion is that it is a deduction allowed by
statute in the determination of net income prior to the
allocation of business within and without the State of
Utah. It is designed to compensate in effect for the
devaluation of mining property which results from mining activities. It is to be treated like depreciation, taxes
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and other costs and expenses specified by statute, and
deducted from the gross income of the taxpayer regardlPss of where the property or personnel earning said
gross income are located. The difference between gross
income and these statutory deductions is the net income
from which is determined income to be allocated to Utah
under the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act. Net income is detPrmined in this manner
regardless of how it is to be allocated under said Act
and Utah law requires that the amount of the depletion
deduction be determined prior to allocation or apportionment of income not otherwise subject to specific allocation under said Uniform Act (R. 44).
Kennecott, on its consolidated returns proposed
to compute its statutory depletion allowance by commencing with gross sales from the Utah property and
deducting certain post mining costs and expenses to
arrive at what it calls "taxable income from the property." From this, it deducts federal income taxes and
miscellaneous charges to obtain a depletable base, multiplies this base by 33-1/3 per cent to arrive at allowable
d!'pletion (R. G83, R. 466, 525) ( R. 465, 524).
K

The Consolidated Returns' Treatmeut uf the
Federal Tax Deducti01i

Tn preparing its Consolidated Franchise Tax Returns under both federal and state laws, Kennecott and
its affiliates, for the pmpose of allocation of federal
income taxes, employed the method which Kenneeott
('.Ontc>nd" is
U. S. Treasury Department

lS
Regulation 1.1502-33( d) (2) (ii) of the Consolidated Return Regulations (R. 44).
The procedure sought to be utilized by Kennecott
for the purpose of allocating federal tax liabilities to
Utah under the Regulation referred to was not available
under federal law until December 31, 1965. Prior to
that time, the federal tax treatment applied to allocations between affiliated corporations was similar to that
allowed by the Commission's Corporation Franchise Tax
Regulation No. 13, which has not been changed since
November, 1964 and which has existed in substantially
the same form for many years (R. 684).
The essence of the deduction proposed by Kennecott
is that under federal law when profit members of an
affiliated group join together for the purpose of filing
a consolidated return it is usually agreed that profit
members will compensate loss members in amounts necessary to reflect the fact that the profit members' tax
would have been greater had not the loss member joined
in the consolidated return (R. 408).
This regulation provides that qualifying corporations may treat such tax compensating payments as
deductible tax payments, both to the profit member
making the payment and the loss member receiving it.
Treas. Reg. 1.1502.33(d)(2)(ii.).
Kennecott claims the right to allocate these resulting
federal tax liabilities as deductions against the Utah
franchise tax under Section 59-13-7, U.C.A. 1953.

lU
F. The Initial Deficiency Assessrnent
Kennecott paid the taxes due as shown on the consolidated returns when filed. No proposed adjustments
or deficiency assessments with relation to these taxes
were made until April 1, 1970. Prior thereto, however,
Tax Commission personnel audited the books and records
of Kennecott in Salt Lake City and New York (R. 45,
305.
Based upon this audit and the facts set forth above,
the Commission's auditing division proposed a deficiency
assessment against Kennecott Copper Corporation and
its affiliated corporations doing business in Utah, pursuant to the provisions of Title 59, Chapter 13, U.C.A.,
1953, as amended (Ex. E) (R. 566- 619).
Under date of April 1, 1970, the Commission, acting
through its auditing division, mailed to Kennecott and
its affiliates at its principal office in New York City
a letter with audit reports attached proposing adjustments for the calendar years 1967 and 1968, indicating
indebtedness for, and 'demanding payment of, additional
taxes for said years as follows :4
1967
Tax assessed against Kennecott
and its affiliates ................................ $1,184,462.68
Less tax previously paid by
Kennecott and its affiliates ..........
278,706.14
Additional tax assessed ·············-···········905,756.54
Interest at 63 to May 31, 1970 ..........
115,483.96
Total additional amounts
claimed to be due ···-·······················
$1,021,240.50
48ee (R. 566-619).

1968
$1,798,680.78
465,789.80
1,332,890.98
89,970.14
$1,422,861.12
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By this letter of .c\pr:] 1, the
zt<lYis0d
Kennecott and its affiliates that any request for redetermination must be filed within sixty (60) days from the
date of the notice; otherwise, the additional tax would
be assessed as required by law (Ex. E) (R. 566).

As a multi-state taxpayer, Kennecott is entitled to
allocate its income among the several states for taxation
purvoses pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, Section 59-13-86,
U.C.A., 1953, unless such Act and the returns filed
pursuant thereto do not fairly allocate and represent
the extent of Kennecott's business activity in the State
of Utah. The Commission proposed to depart from
the Uniform Formula and has the burden of proof with
respect to departure from the formula established by
the Act (R. 569) (See 59-13-86-95, U.C.A., 1953)
The auditing division concluded that Section 5913-95, U.C.A., 1953, could be used to vary the returns
as filed as they did not fairly represent the extent of
Kennecott's business activity in Utah for those years
(R. 569, 597) (Ex E).
G. How the Deficiency Assessment Varies the

Formula Used by the Returns
The deficiency assessment commences with Kennecott Copper Corporation's admitted net income from
the Utah mine as contained in the consolidated returns
for the years in question. After miscellaneous adjust-
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m<>nb, it deducts allmrnhlP frd0ral inconw taxPs to
at nd income before depletion (R. 572, 600) (Ex. E)
The andit then deducts specifically allocahle income
as is required by :o;tatute to arrive at net income for
the purpose of the depletion computation. The original
audit then applied a formula designed to determine by
means of a simultaneous equation hoth income from
the property assessed to Utah and statutory depletion
(R. fi72, 600) (Ex. E).
Essentially, the audit then deducts allowable depletion to arrive at income subject to apportionment and
applies the apportionment fraction of the Uniform Act
to arrive at income to be allocated to Utah for Kennecott Copper Corporation (Ex E.).
As there is no information in the consolidated returns regarding actual net income from the Utah activities of Kennecott Copper Corporation's other subsidiaries and affiliated corporations, their tax liability to
Utah is computed in accordance with the Uniform Act
and added to the liability of the parent, Kennecott Copper Corporation, to obtain the total income of the affiliated group to be allocated to Utah (Ex E).
Kennecott questions not only the Commission's right
tu depart from the formula hut the propriety of the
rnl'thod outlined above. In addition, it challenges the
Commission's depletion calculation and the amount of
feclt>ral tax deduction allowed by the audit report. Furth0r factual information is accordingly set forth regarding clq'l"ti 0>1 2 ri<l tlw f0d1'ral tax dPduction.
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H. The Commission's Treatment of Depletion
The auditing division of the Commission proposed
to compute the depletion allowance by commencing with
Kennecott's "taxable income from the property" figure,
adding back certain items of profit or loss which are
attributable to income from the property, deducting the
allowable federal tax and specifically allocable income
to arrive at a depletable base. To this base the auditing
division applied a formula heretofore devised by the
parties, by mutual agreement, to obtain net income
assignable to Utah and divided this figure by three to
arrive at an allowable depletion (R. 572, 600).
The purpose of the aforesaid formula was to determine net income assignable to Utah by means of a simultaneous mathematical equation. This net income, less
post mining profits and taxes, would then be equated
in the audit deficiency to net income from the property
for purposes of computing allowable depletion (R. 864).
At the formal hearing below the Commission concluded that the formula proposed by the Commission's
auditing division to determine the depletion allowance
to which Kennecott is entitled is inapplicable to the
present case because income from the property is known
and is set forth on Kennecott's returns (R. 689).
The Commission, by its decision, then determined
that the depletion allowance to which Kennecott is entitled should be determined in accordance with the following computation :5
5See (R. 691).

KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION & AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS

Computation of Depletion at 33-% % of the Net Income
from the Property after Applying the Utah Fraction
1967

Taxable income from the property (per audit)
Deduct: Related federal income tax (per audit)

---------------

$33,380,443.69
714,953.08
32,665,490.11
66.16713
Utah Fraction ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------·--21,613,807.84
Income subject to depletion ···-··················-···-··················-·····-···--················
7,204,602.61
Depletion at 33-l/a% ···-··························-··········-··········-··············-··········-···-·
Apportionable Income - Utah Copper Div., Schedule 3 ··············--·---29,175,461.36
5,458, 102.11
Add: Depletjon per original report, Schedule 3 ···-·······························---·
34,633,563.47
7,204,602.61
Deduct: Depletion computed above ···························-······························27 ,428,960.86
66.16713
Utah appo.rtionment fraction ·······································-··-··········-·················
18,148,947.96
Add: Tintic Division net income (loss), Schedule 4 ················-······-········ 435,481.89
18,584,429.85
Kennecott Copper Division Allocated to Ut:ah ·······························-··········
Chase Brass & Copper Co., Inc. Allocated to Utah ···-··························· 13,123.03
Bear Creek Mining Company Allocated to Utah ................................... .
8,144.80
57.64
Kennecott Communications Corp. Allocated to Utah ·············--·····-·······
Peabody Coal Co. (formerly Kenbody, Inc.) Allocated to Utah ......... .
-0(20,319.40)
Total Income Allocated to Utah ···············-··-···············--·-··-··-············-·······
18,585,435.92
Tax at 6% ·······························-······-··································-······-·······················
1,115,126.16
Tax Paid ···-··························-·······························································-········-····
278,706.14
Balance of Tax Due ···-··················--·-··-···················-···············-··-···············
836,420.02
Interest at: 6% to May 15, 1971 ·······-··-··········--·-······-·······························
154,737.70

1968
$57,836,703.08
5,833,044.51
52,003,658.57
65.56213
34,094,690.64
11,364,896.88
46,520,843.46
8,563,662.24
55,084,505. 70
11,364,896.88
43,719,608.82
65.56213
28,663,493.65
(507,349.33)
28,156,144.32
4,381.47
4,446.55
46.55
(517.80)
(23,036.41)
28,141,464.68
1,688,487.88
(i) 513,065.66
1,175,422.22
146,927.78

Total Amount Due ···-······················-······-···············
$2,313,507.72
$ 991,157.72
$ 1,322,350.00
(i) Includes pa:Yment of $47,275.86 tax received December 15, 1970. Also, interest of $4,727,59 was
paid, computed at 63 from April 15, 1969 to December 31, 1970.
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The Commission conclud<•d that th0 taxable incom0
from the property figure in Kennecott's returns included
income from post mining activities and was subject to
fnrther adjustment before the computation of the depletion allowance. The Commission held that Kennecott
was not entitled to a deduction of one-third of this
amount, but that depletion should only be computed on
"net income from the property" (R. 688, 689, 691).
The Commission determined that the net income
from the Utah mining operations of Kennecott is equivalent to what was denominated taxable income from the
property by Kennecott on its returns, and that such
taxable income includes post mining income and that
in order to compute the depletion allowance to which
KennPcott is entitled, post mining incomP should he
excluded (R. 689).
The Commission proceeded to apply the formula
derived from the application of the Uniform Act to
Kennecott's reported net income from its Utah operations to determine how much of this income was to be
attributed to post mining activities. It concluded that
the use of the formula for this purpose wai:; reasonable
and proper and had been utilized in previous cases
(R. 689, 691). 8

I. The Commission's Treatment of the Federal Tax
Deduction
sSee Kennecott Copper Co. v. Stare Tax Commission, 118 Utah
140, 221 P.2d 857; Kennecott Copper Corporation v. S'tat;e Tax Commission, 5 Utah 306, 301 P.2d 562.

The auditing division of the Commission disallowed
Kennecott's computation of the federal tax deduction
on the ground that certain tax credits included in Kennecott's tax computation were not allowable under Utah
law inasmuch as they represented tax losses arising out
of Utah (Ex E).
Gain or loss on intercompany transactions between
affiliated corporations filing a consolidated return in
the State of Utah is not recognized nor allowed by the
Utah Franchise Tax Regulation 13 (R. 684, 685).
The auditing division took the position, which was
sustained by the Commission, that as the deduction was
claimed in the consolidated return, the Commission's
acceptance of a consolidated return is conditioned upon
the consent by Kennecott to the application of Utah
Franchise Tax Regulations in effect at the time of filing
such a return (R. 685).
Corporation Franchise Tax Regulation No. 13 ( 4) in
effect for the taxable years in question provides in part
as follows:
"(b) In general, the assignment of federal income taxes shall be made only to those segments
of net income subject to federal income tax and
shall be made on the basis of net income before
Federal taxes. . . .
( c) Federal income tax assignments are to be
made to profit producing items or divisions only
. . . the Utah State Tax Commission does not
recognize for Utah corporation franchise tax purposes the so-called 'tax-savings' resulting from
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loss items. 'Red-figure' allocations of federal income taxes will not be accepted. Loss items or
divisions must not be assigned any federal income
tax, either positive or negative . . . . " (R. 685)
(R. 554)
.J. The Commission's Conclusions

Notwithstanding criticism of the proposed audit
deficiency by Kennecott's experts, it was sustained by
the Tax Commission except in the area of depletion.
The Commission concluded in part:
1. "Because of Kennecott's particular method of
operation and the fact that Section 59-13-93, U.C.A.,
1953 is different from Section 16 of the Model Uniform
Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, in that sales
which might be assigned to Utah under the Model Act
'may not be assignable to this state under Section 5913-93, ... that a reasonable allocation of income to the
State of Utah will not result by applying the three factor
allocation formula established in Section 59-13-86 to the
consolidated returns filed by Kennecott herein. For these
reasons, the statutory formula method of allocating income need not be followed by the Commission, but other
adjustments may he made as provided by Franchise Tax
Regulation No. 8, Paragraph 3." (R. 688)

2. "The audit deficiency proposed by the Tax Commission as modified hereby fairly allocates the tax liability of Kennecott to the State of Utah." (R. 687)
3. "Kennecott has accepted and is bound by Commission regulations governing the filing of consolidated

returns, including Regulation 4 and Regulation 13 and,
therefore, the action of Kennecott in claiming a deduction for Federal Income Taxes pursuant to Treasury
Regulation 1.1502-33( d) (2) is improper." (R. 688)
4. "The depletion allowance to which Kennecott is
entitled is available only under rnles and regulations
prescribed by the Tax Commission and that the issue
of whether depletion is to be allowed on post mining
acti,·ities is res adjudicata under the decision of the Utah
Supreme Court in J( e11necott Copper Company L·. State
Tax Commission, 118 Utah 140, 221 P 2d 857, and Ken-

necott Copper Corporation v. State Tax Commission,
5 Utah 2d 306, 301 P 2d 562." (R. 688)

5. "The Auditing Division has not disregarded the
consolidated returns filed by Kennecott and has not
'unconsolidated' said returns by proposing a deficiency
assessment against Kennecott, pursuant to the provisions
of 59-13-95 ,UCA, 1953." (R. 687)
6. "The distribution, apportionment and allocation
of income, between and among the Kennecott Copper
Corporation and its affiliated corporations, proposed by
the audit deficiency, is necessary to prevent an evasion
of taxes or otherwise to clearly reflect the income of
Kennecott and is authorized by the terms of Section
59-13-17, UCA, 1953, as well as the terms of Section
59-13-95, UCA, 1953." (R. 687)
7. "Cases Nos. 7298 and 8091 involving Kennecott
and the Commission, as heretofore decided by the Utah
Supreme Court, authorized the Commission to limit its
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inquiry and assessment for tax purposes to nd income
directly related to the affairs of the Utah Division of
Kenneeott." (R. 687)
8. "There is no showing of undue hardship or other
valid reason which would properly justify this Commission to waive or reduce the interest imposed by the
statute on tax deficiencies determined herein." (R. 690)
9. "The gross receipts from sales of Utah property
delivered or shipped to purchasers outside this state
are within the jurisdiction of the State of Utah for tax
purposes and may be included within the deficiency
assessments herein upon a proper showing that the allocation and apportionment provisions of Section 59-13-78,
et seq., UCA, 1953, do not fairly represent the extent
of the taxpayer's business activity." (R. 687)
10. "The world-wide industrial enterprise of Kennecott, including the operations of its various subsidiaries, divisions and affiliated companies, and including
all matters relating to mining, smelting, refining, transportation, fabricating and selling, is managed, directed
and coordinated as a unitary business." (R. 687)
11. "'l'hat the deficit>ney <:U:lSPSSlllC'nt:-; in no \nly yiolate Amendment V, Amendent IX, or Article I, Seetions
1, 7 and 24 or Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution
of the United States. The deficiency assessments herein
place no burden upon interstate commerce and foreign
commerce in violation of the commerce clause of the
Constitution of the United States." (R. 688)

POINT I
THE CONSOLIDATED RETURNS AS FILED, DO
NOT FAIRLY REPRESENT THE EXTENT OF
KENNECOTT'S BUSINESS ACTIVITY IN UTAH.

A - The Burden of Proof
Notwithstanding the fact that the number one stipulated issue in this case is whether the returns filed fairly
represent the taxpayers business activity in Utah, this
question is largely ignored by Kennecott on appeal.
Instead it relies on time-honored techniques of emotionalism, obfuscation and nitpicking to divert the court's
attention from this fundamental issue. The twin spectres
of federal intervention and loss of Utah industry are
raised and the blame for these evils is anticipatorily
fixed with the court in the event it fails to uphold
Kennecotts position.
Kennecott characterizes as "meaningless and legally
quite irrelevant" the admitted facts that according to
its returns it had gross receipts of $117,433,496.51 and
net income of in excess of $33,000,000.00 from its Utah
property in 1967 but allocated to Utah for tax purposes
only $4,645,102.31 or approximately l/s of that amount.
It then says that because the Commission's evidence
showing unfair representation of business activity, obtained from Kennecotts own returns, resulted from separate accounting computations (again by Kennecott)
that such evidence is legally inadmissible to impeach
the propriety and applicability of the formula of the
Uniform Act. (P. Br. 69-76)

It is in this context that the Commission will show
that the tax returns filed by Kennecott for the years
in question do not fairly represent the extent of the
taxpayers' business activity in Utah during such years.

As has been previously indicated, for the taxable
years 1967 and 1968 Kennecott filed timely consolidated
franchise tax returns in the State of Utah. These returns included the consolidated net income of all of the
affiliated corporations doing business in Utah, and computed franchise tax liability to the State of Utah by
applying the allocation formula set forth in the Uniform
Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, Section 59to 9-± FCA l!J53, as amendc"<l, to ib consoli<latt><l
operations.
Section 59-13-95, UCA, 1953, as amended, provides
that, "If the allocation and apportionment provisions
of this Act do not fairly represent the extent of the
taxpayer's business activity" that the tax commission
may substitute some other method more fairly reflecting
the business activity in this state.
Except for the consolidated return features of the
present case, a similar issue was before the Court in
the case of Western Contracting Corporation v. State
Tax Commission, 18 Utah 2d 23, 414 P. 2d 579. In that
case, a single taxpayer conducting business operations
in Utah and other states was subjected to a deficiency
assessment by the Commission, which alleged that the
former statutory formula should be disregarded because
it did not allocate to the state the proportion of net
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income fairly and equitably attributable to Utah. The
Court analyzed the previous law and declared that the
Utah Statute, "clearly expresses a preference for the
statutory formula. Our legislature has created a presumption that the statutory formula provided in subsection (6) will allocate the proportionate net income
fairly and equitably attributable to this state." p. 28.
The Court, on page 31 of the Western Contractinq
decision, further stated :
"This court has previously held in Kennecott
Copper v. State Tax Commission that the Tax
Commission should follow the rules as provided
in subsection ( 6), unless the statutory formula
fails to accomplish the overarching purpose as
revealed by subsection (8), i.e., by application
of the rules, there is a failure to allocate to this
state a proportion of net income fairly and equitably attributable to this state or where the rules
would subject a taxpayer to double taxation."
The Court continued:
"In the instant case, there has been no evidence
appertaining to double taxation; the issue is
which method of allocation fairly reflects the net
income attributable to Utah. We hold that, if the
operations of a multi-state corporation be wnitary
in character, the proportion of net income to be
allocated to this state must be determined by
the statutory formula (subsection ( 6) 1, unless the
party opposing the application of such formula
shall prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the taxes so imposed are grossly disproportionate
to the business conducted in this state or subjects

the taxpayer to double taxation." Emphasi:a

Added) 18 Utah 2d p. 31.

Section 59-13-20, UCA, 1953, the subject of the
Western Coutracting case, has since been repealed and
its place taken by the Uniform Division of Income for
Tax Purposes Act. The language of Section 59-13-95 of
the Uniform Act, however, reaffirms when read in connection with the holding of the Court in Western Contracting, that the burden of proof is on the party opposing the application of the formula.
Section 59-13-96, UCA 1953, as amended, provides
that the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes
Act, "shall be so construed as to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which
enact it." Some of the purposes of the foregoing section
are set forth in comments to the Uniform Division of
Income for Tax Purposes Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. Page 565 of the Record herein includes these
comments and states :
"Section [95] is intended as a broad authority,
within the principle of apportioning business income fairly among the states which have contact
with the income, to the tax administrator to vary
the apportionment formula and to vary the system of allocation where the provisions of the
Act do not fairly represent the extent of the Taxpayer's business activity in the state. The phrases
in Section [95(d)] do not foreclose the use of one
method for some business activity and a different
method for different business activity. Neither
does the phrase 'method' limit the administrator
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to substituting factors in the formula. The phrase
means any other method of fairly representing
the extent of the Taxpayer's business activity in
the state."
Applying the rule of ejusdem generis to the phrase
"business activity" found in Section 59--13-95, any meaning which may otherwise be given to the word "activity"
is restricted and limited to what is included in the
wo:·d "business." See Breitinger v. City of Philadephia,
3G3 Pa. Sup. 512, 70 At. 2d 640, 645.
The term "business' is very broad and its meaning
depends on its context, or upon the purpose of the legislature and the use of the word. It has been held to
mean anything which occupies the time, labor or attention of a corporation for the purpose of a profit. See
Words and Phrases, Perm. Ed., Business, pages 601-606.
The term "allocation" 'vi.th respect to taxation of
a multi-state business, means the process of attributing
to the taxing state the value of a portion of its interstate activity for tax purposes. Yellowstone Pipeline v.
St.ate Board of Equalization, 138 1\lont. G03, 358 P. :2d 55,
60. Apportionment has been held to be an act of dividing
and assigning in just proportion. Hunt v. Callaghan,
32
235, 257 P. 648, 649.
Accordingly, in order to sustain the Tax Coirunissio·1's departure from the statutory formula it must first
appear that Kennecott's consolidated returns, as filed,
with particular reference to significant aspects of businef s activity, do not allocate or apportion to Utah a
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jm.t, equitable or fair percentage for tax purposes of
its business activity.
The question of how to rebut the presumption of
formula applicability was before the Court in the much
citPd rase of Butler Brothers i:. MrC'1o,r;an, 17 Cal. 2d
61)4, 111 P. 2d 334, affirmed 315 U.S. 501, 62 S. Ct 701,
8G L. Ed. 991, The California Supreme Court there
stated:
"To rebut the presumption that the formula produced a fair result, 'the burden is on the taxpayer to make oppression manifest by clear and
cogent evidence' Norfolk and Western Ry. Co.
v. State of North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 297
U.S. 682, 56 Sup. Ct. 625, 80 Law Ed. 977. In
considering the implications of the formula in
the last mentioned case, the Supreme Court of
the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice
Cardozo, also said, at page 688 of 297 U.S., at
page 628 of Sup. Ct., 80 Law Ed. 977: " ... 'a taxpayer does not escape the application of the statute by evidence directed to only one of the related
terms. Its evidence to be effective must be directed to each of them alike, for only thus can
the assumed relation between them be proved to
be unreal ... ' In the case at bar, appellant has
not furnished any explanation of why its California business differs so from the average that
the formula produced an erroneous result. Here
there has been only an assertion that a loss was
incurred in this state. As appellant has failed
to sho"· a yari::uwe from the normal in eitlwr the
California sales, property or payroll, or in either
expenses or revenues, it is our conclusion that
appellant has not upheld its burden of proof,
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for in order to overthrow a formula, the taxpayer
must introduce such evidence and the evidence
must go to each element of the formula equation."
p. 341.
Accepting the burden of proof as defined by the
Utah Supreme Court in the Western Contracting case
and the California Supreme Court in Butler Brothers v.
M cColgan, the Tax Commission submits the evidence
is clear and convincing that the taxes resulting from the
formula are grossly disproportionate to business conducted in this state.
B - The Property Factor
The Uniform Act suggest that the significant and
controlling indicia of business activity for purposes of
allocation and apportionment are property, payroll and
sales.
The property factor is a fraction, the numerator
of which is the average value of the Taxpayer's real
and tangible personal property owned and rented and
used in this state during the tax period and the denominator of which is the average value of all similar property wherever used during the same period. Sec. 59-13-87,
UCA, 1953.

In 1967, the Taxpayer reported for purposes of its
consolidated corporation franchise tax return· an apportionment fraction, the numerator of which was $329,428,667. 70 and the denominator of which was $775,807,391.97
with a resulting apportionment fraction showing that
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42.46269% of the Taxpayer's tangible property was
located in the State of Utah (R. 435). In 1968, the
property fraction included a numerator of $359,137,292.91
and a denominator of $1,007,313,895.65, resulting in an
apportionment fraction of 35.65297% of the Taxpayer's
total tangible property in Utah (R. 494).
C - The Payroll Factor
In 1967, the Taxpayer, in accordance with Section
59-V"l-90, lTCA, 1933, apportioned its payroll by using
a fraction, the numerator of which was total eompensation paid in this state and the denominator of
which was total compensation paid ev<·rywhere. 'l1hP
resulting fractions showed numerators in 1967 of $44,142,556.24 and a denominator of $102,926,954.90 for an
apportionment fraction of 42.88727% of the total payroll
of the Taxpayer in Utah (R. 435). In 1968, the numerator of the fraction disclosed $55,396,136.34 paid in Utah
as compared with $166,040,056.94 paid everywhere for
an apportionment fraction of 33.36312% of Kennecotts
total payroll attributable to its Utah operation (R. 494).
D - The Sales Factor
With respect to gross receipts or sales, Kennecott
allocated this income to Utah pursuant to the provisions
of Section 59-13-92, which determines the sales factor to
be "a fraction, the numerator of which is the total sales
of the taxpayer in this state during the tax period, and
the denominator of which is the total sales of the taxpayer everywhere during the tax period."

.,.)'
Kennecott construed Sections 59-13-93 and 94 to
mean that sales of tangible personal property were not
to be included in the numerator of the sales factor fraction if :mrh property was shipped or clE>linred to inn·chasers outside of the state. Based upon this determination ,it allocated to the numerator of the sales fraction,
$3,308,738.42 for 1967 gross receipts and sales and as a
denominator, reported $397,937,486.78, resulting in an
apportionment fraction of .83147% of its sales attributable to Utah. In 1968, the same fraction revealed a
numerator of $3,701,583.78 and a denominator of $650,966,525.70, for an apportionment fraction of .56863% of
its total sales attributable to its Utah operations (R.
435, 494).
Notwithstanding the foregoing computations, Kennecott for purposes of computing and claiming a depletion
allowance on its consolidated return, reported 1967 gross
sales from its Utah Division of $201,450,760.93. Therefore, based on Kennecott's own figures, it appears that
in 1967, approximately 39.77% of its gross sales resulted
from its Utah operations and that approximately 30.94%
of said sales resulted from its 1968 Utah operations.
J<J-Conclusion
Averaging the percentage fractions for the years
in question, it is readily apparent that approximately
41. 71 % of Kennecott's business activity, as determined
by property, payroll and sales in the year 1967 resulted
from its Utah operations. In addition, approximately
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33.32% of its business ctivity as determined by the
same factors resulted from its Utah activity in 1968.
On its 1967 franchise tax return, the affiliated group
reported a net income of $39,868,473.91. Of this amount,
it allocated to Utah the snm of $4,645,102.31. Similarly,
in 1968, Kennecott reported a net income of $78,331,527.93 and assigned to Utah the sum of $7,763,163.36.
In other words, for the taxable year 1967, although
41.71 % of Kennecott's business activity resulted from
its Utah operations, only 11.65% of its net income was
assignable to business done in Utah for the purposes
of payi:r,g tax thereon. In 1968, the facts were similar.
In that year, approximately 31.31 % of the groups business activity resulted from its Utah operations and only
9.91 % of its net income was assigned to business done
m Utah, for purposes of paying Franchise tax.
In addition, approximately one-third of Kennecotts
employees are employed in the State of Utah. Approximately one-third of all of the copper sold by it each year
is produced in Utah. Approximately 25% of the nation's.
primary production of copper results from the Bingham
Mine.

In the year 1968, the total domestic copper production of Kennecott was 378,215 tons. Of this amount,
the Utah Copper Division produced 203,198 tons or
53.72%. In the same year, Kennecott Copper Corporation and all of its affiliates mined, milled and treated
a total of 47,249,069 tons of ore, of which the Utah
Copper Division accounted for 28,343,900 tons or 59.98%.

Kennecott claims that the Commission has failed
to meet its burden because its decision is premised on
the sales factor only. The record speaks quite to the
contrary.
The test of Butler Brothers is to show a variation
in each factor of the formula from the average sufficient
to prove the average unreal. The California Supreme
Court has said that evidence has to be directed to each
of the factors and that a variance from normal or the
in each of the factors o rin expenses or revPnues
must be shown in order to overthrow the formula.
In the present case, there is no question but that
the property and payroll factors are grossly disproportionate to business reported by the taxpayer. The evidence to this effect is obtained from Kennecotts own
returns.
\Vith similar evidence, the Commission has shown,
not only that the sales factor does not fairly reflect
actual business activity in the area of sales, but that
the reported business activity of Kennecott, is minuscule
compared to the average of actual payroll, pro1wrty and
sales. In addition, revenues allocated to Utah by the
formula do not fairly correspond to the Utah divisions
proportionate contribution to the taxpayer's total revenues.
The Commission submits that all indicia of business
activity and the uncontroverted evidence herein indicate
that the income attributable to the State of Utah by
Kennecott on its consolidated franchise tax returns is
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out of all approvriate vroportion to the business transacted by the taxpayer in this state. Any given measure
of business activity reflects that from 30% to 50% of
Kennecott's entire net income for the years in question
resulted from its Utah operations. The Tax Commission
submits that it is patently unfair, under the circumstances, for Kennecott to assign to Utah by means of
the returns in question only 11.55% of its income for
the year 1967 and 9.91 % of said income for the year 1968.
POINT II
THE AUDIT DEFICIENCY FAIRLY ALLOCATES
THE TAX LIABILITY 0 F THE TAXPAYER TO
THE STATE OF UTAH.

A - The Commissions Deficiency Assessment
The Utah Copper Division, consisting of the mine
m Utah, together with the sales office in New York,
is a unitary operation subject to tax, as such, without
reference to the other aspects of Kennecott's business
or the operations of subsidiaries in other states. This·
principle has been upheld by the Utah Supreme Court
against the same Taxpayer in two previous decisions.
Kennecott Copper Company v. State Tax Commission,
No. 7298, 118 Utah 140, 221 P. 2d 857; Kennecott Copper
Corporation v. State Tax Conimission, No. 8091, 5 Utah
2d 306, 301 P. 2d 562. Kennecott's method of operation
in Utah has changed very little since the previous cases
in this regard.
Even if it is determined that Kennecott is now more
fully integrated than it was in Case 8091, the Commis-
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s10ns position is the same. That is, it is entitled to
levy a franchise tax on the taxpayer in proportion to
the business activity conducted in this state. Whether
the Utah Copper Division, Kennecott Copper Corporation or Kennecott as an affiliated group is the taxpayer
makes no difference as the return as filed by whatever
taxpayer must reflect fairly the extent of business done
in Utah. If it does not, then the Commission is empowered by 59-13-95 UCA, 1953, as amended, to devise
a method which will fairly reflect and tax business
activity.
The 'l'ax Commission concluded below that the
returns herein, do not fairly reflect the extent of the
Taxpayer\; business activity in Utah. 'r11e lt>gislature has
Pstahlished a formula and indicated that the Commission
has the power to select another method which more fairly
r<'flects tnw net income in Utah. The Commission
is given discretion to modify the prescribed formula
and it must appear that it acted arbitrarily or abused
this discretion before the Supreme Court will interfere
with its deficiency assessment. See Kennecott Copper
Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 118 Utah 140,
221 P. 2d 857; 59-13-95 UCA 1953, as amended; Western
Contracting Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 18 Utah 2d
23, 414 P. 2d 579. 1
1Wbere it was held:
"that, if the operations of a multi-state corporation· be unitary
in character, the proportion of net income to be allocated
to this state must be determined by the stautory formula ...
unless he party opposing the application of the formula shall
prove . . . that the taxes opposing the application of the
formula shall prove ... that the taxes so imposed are grossly
disproportionate to the business conducted in this state ..."
p. 31

4:2

For the years in question, the 'rax Commission proposed that a more equitable allocation of income to this
state would be to accept the net taxable income from
the property figures from Kennecott's computation of
depletion schedules in its returns to arrive at income
to be allocated to Utah. From these figures, the Commission, again using Kennecott's own figures, computed
income from the Utah property by subtracting from
gross sales a proportionate part of post mining costs
to arrive at net income from the property. A deduction
of one-third of this income has been then allowed as·
depletion. After other miscellaneous adjustments have
been made, the Commission has allocated to Utah as
income for the Taxpayer in the year 19G7, the sum of
$19,741,044.65 and the sum of $29,978,012.94 for the year
1968.
Kennecott complains that by this method the Commission has allocated more income to Utah than is reported in the same years on the federal tax returns for
Kennecotts entire operations. In this regard, it must
be noted that the net income figures on the taxpayers
1967 and 1968 federal returns were obtained only after
deducting a depletion allo,vaneP from what would otherwise be taxable income. '1 his depletion allowance was
disallowed by the 'l ax Commis:;;on, and the Commission
8
submits has been h<>rdofore cfompproved by this court.
1

1

On its 1%7 rdnrn, in arriving at the net income
mentioned above, Kennecott claimed a depletion of $16,sSee Point IV, Infra.
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067,738.00. The Tax Commission allowed only $5,743,260.4 7 as depletion for that year. The difference of
$10,324,377.53 should be added to the net income reported
on Kennecott's 1967 return for purposes of determining
what percentage of its net income has been assigned to
Utah by the Tax Commission, as a result of its audit
deficiency.
Similarly, m the year 1968, the Taxpayer claimed
a depletion allowance of $32,044,243.00. The Tax Commission allowed a depletion deduction of $10,651926.00,
resulting in a difference of $21,392,317.00. Therefore,
if the net income reported on the Taxpayer's returns is
increased by these amounts, the taxable net income to
the State of Utah, as shown by the Taxpayer's own
returns for the year 1967 is $50,192,951.44 and the net
income for the year 1968 is $99, 723,844.93. Thus, from
net income as reported by theTaxpayer subject only to
an adjustment for the disallowance of the depletion deduction, the Tax Commission's audit deficiency has
assigned to Utah for the year 1967, 39.3% of the Taxpayer's net income and in the year 1968, 30.1 %.

B-Separate Accounting
Kennecott seemingly says that the Commission has
no right to use the actual figures regarding payroll,
property and gross receipts from its Utah Division to
justify its deficiency because these figures are obtained
through Kennecott's own books and records. This is
tantamount to claiming that the Commission and the
court cannot review the facts where they contradict a
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statutory fiction. The Commission cannot comprehend
such a position.
For example, Kennecott equates actual gross receipts from Utah as computed, accounted for and contained on its own books and records with the kind of
separate accounting which was circumscribed in Butler
Brus. i-. McClogan (supra). It then cites that case as
authority for the proposition that separate accounting
can only be used in a non-unitary business.
Kennecott thereby attempts to impeach its own
records and the tax returns filed with this state by
saying that the Commission is powerless to accept the
figures on the returns as factual for any purpose other
than that proposed by the taxpayer. The Commission
submits that such a repudiation of facts is untenable.
If gross receipts from Utah property can be used for
the purpose of determining deductions from the Utah
tax they can also be used to show the disproportionate
tax proffered by the taxpayer to the State of Utah.
It should be noted that the Commission does not
rely on separate accounting computations of its own in
its deficiency assessment. It accepts the veracity of the
taxpayer's figures and applies the formula of the Uniform Act to them. The Commission does not seek to
tax all of the admitted gross receipts from Kennecott's
Utah Mine. Rather, it allocates payroll, property and
sales from Utah in accordance with the Uniform Act.
The net result of this is that only 66.1671 % of the income
from the Utah mine in 1967, after appropriate deduc-

tions, was allocated to Utah for franchise tax purposes.
Similarly in 1968, 65.5621 % of the taxpayers Utah income, after deductions was allocated to Utah and subjected to the franchise tax by the Commission.
The reason for the general prohibition of separate
accounting to a unitary business is that it is normally
impossible to determine the extent to which the activities
of such a taxpayer in one state contribute to or are
dependent upon other state activities. However, with
respect to the income and depletion figures from the
Utah mine, these are readily ascertainable because of
Kennecotts internal organization and accounting procedures.
The utilization of such figures is acceptable even
to Plaintiff's witness, Mr. Kessling. He has stated that
even where the business is integrated:
"Income attributable to the state should be determined by first segregating and specifically
allocating certain classes of income according to
the residence or domicile of the taxpayer or the
source of the income." (Emphasis supplied) Allocation of Income in State Taxation. George T.
Altman and Frank M. Keesling, (1946) p. 107.
Thus, using admitted income from the Utah property, and utilizing the fonnula to apportion post mining
costs and other deductions, the Commission has sustained the deficiency assessments against Kennecott by
treating the Utah Copper Division as a nnitary entity
and the remainder of Kennecott as another.
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C - Conclusion
The noted author, Jerome R. Hellerstein, writing
m tlw National Tax J ournal,9 suggests that the Commission's approach to the tax assessment herein may
be superior to the res nlts of the Uniform Act as proposed by K('nnt'cott. Af h•r exhaustively reviewing the
background and casPs of tax apportionment of unitary
business, Mr. Hellerstcin analyzes the lJrOs and cons
of formula Ys. separatP aecounting apportionment.
Ile suggests that distortion results where formula
apportionment is applied to non-operating fractions of
a unitary lrnsin('ss and that more equitable results may
bP obtained by "treating an enterprise as unitary on
a rt>gional basis."
.Mr. Hellerstein points out that the State of California has a different statute and different concept of
unitary business than other states 10 and proceeds to
criticize that concept as defined in Snperior Oil Co. 1'.
•Recent Developments in State Tax Apportionment and The
Circumscription of Unitary Business. Jerome R. Hellerstein, National
Tax Journal, Vol. XXI (1968) pp. 487-503.
10Cf. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, 111 P. 2d 334,
where the California Court said:

"It is only if its business within the state is truly separate and
distinct from its business without this state, so that the segregation of income may be made clearly and accurately, that the
separate accounting method may properly be used." p. 336

and Western States Contracting v. State Tax Commission, supra,
where the Utah Court stated that he formula should be used unless
"the taxes so imposed are grossly dispropotionate fo the business conducted in this state." 18 Utah 2d. p. 31
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Franchise Tax Board, 34 Cal. Rptr. 545, 386 P. 2d 33
as follows:
Consequently, the non-operating functions of an
relied on in Superior Oil, although
centralized, ought not lay the basis for holding
the enterprise unitary. Not only is there no reason
in the considerations which gave birth to formulary apportionment to push the technique to this
point, but perhaps of greater moment is the fact
that so broad a sweep of formulary apportionment tends to push distortion and misallocation
to unacceptable levels. Superior Oil, is a case
in })()int. 'l'lw Company had earning::; in California,
on a sqiarate accounting for the overations in that
statP, of $10.G million, hut Lecause it had losses
on a separate accounting basis in other states
($3.4 million in Louisiana), unitary apportionment enabled the taxpayer to reduce its California income by such out-of-state losses to $1.1
million, about 10 per cent of its California operating profits on a separate accounting basis.
Businesses again and again do operate more
profitably in one state than another; regional
profits vary; when a new market is being exploited, iirofits are likely to be low, and when
a new product has been developed ahead of competitors, profits for that division may be high,
and so on.
Moreover, there is ample statutory warrant in
the laws of most states, at least, for avoiding
the type of distortion due to formulary aportionrnent - at times resnlting in OYPrtaxation and at
other times in undertaxation - where the formulary apportionment is grounded on ancillary,
non-operating functions. The California statute
applied in Superior Oil is typical. The statute

called for "an allocation upon the basis of sales,
purchi:ses, expenses of manufacture, payroll, value
and situs of tangible property, or reference to
any of these or other factors or by such other
method as is fairly calculated to determine the
net income derived from or attributable to sources
within this state.... " The Uniform Division of
Income for Tax Purposes Act contains a similar
provision.
Such statutory provisions afford adequate legal
authority for limiting formulary apportionment
to interdependent operating functions. It is to
be observed that frequently this may mean treating an enterprise as unitary on a regional basis.
For example, if a manufacturing business divides
its operations on a regional basis, with its sources
of raw materials, processing and marketing, in
the Pacific Coast states interrelated, but ·with
similar functions carried on along the East Coast
by the Atlantic region, the Pacific and Atlantic
regions wonld each
be classified as unitary businesses and be subject to apportionnwnt
by formula, but not the combined enterprise, despite centralizing management, financing, advertising, research, and the like.
Formulary apportionment has long been, and
remains, a highly useful invention but, like many
new devices, it has been pushed beyond i.ts effective scope to a point where its proper functions
need to be carefully re-examined. In this re-look
at the growth of formulary apportionment, I have
suggested that the test of a unitary business
bottomed on the interdependence of the basw
operating activities of the enterprise. This would
embrace not only the typical buying or manufac
turing of goods in one state and selling them
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in another, but also inter-state transportation and
communication, mining or processing in one state
and
in others, and the like. However,
centralized management financing, advertising,
the use of patents, trade marks and know-how
the training or furnishing of personnel and of
legal or technical services, and other ancillary
or supportive activities, important though they
be to the profits of the entire enterprise ought
not ordinarily, at least, lay the foundation for
multistate unitary business apportionment by
formula. Such an approach to the contours of
the unitary conception is amply justified by the
broad and flexible statutory provisions for the
division of income, capital stock and other tax
measures in most states. And given the recent
Supreme Court decisions, which may perhaps
reflect a new approach to state tax apportionment problems, such a circumscription of the unitary business may conceivably emerge as a requirement of the Due Process and the Commerce
Clauses in preventing extraterritorial taxation
and in proscribing undue burdens on interestate
commerce. J. Hellerstein, National Tax Journal
pp. 502-503.
Thus the Commission's approach to the problem of
an equitable apportionment of Kennecotts income to the
State of Utah is justified in -many respects. The significant portion of Kennecotts business activity in Utah
is conducted by its Utah Copper Division. Previous
assessments against Kennecott Copper Corporation and
some of its affiliates based primarily on the business
activity of the Utah Copper Division have heretofore
been sustained by this Court. The deficiency assessments
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in the present case are similar in approach to previous
assessments.

It is submitted that the assessments sustained by
the Commission herein do not justify an accusation of
arbitrary and capricious conduct. The deficiencies, in
and of themselves, are supported by the facts of the case
and do not subject the Taxpayer to double taxation or
in anyway violate the spirit or purpose of the U niforrn
Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act. The perof the audit deficiency are amply
centage
justified by the business activity of the Taxpayer in
this State.
POINT III
TAX COMMISSION REGULATION NO. 13 IS CONTROLLING WITH REGARD TO THE METHOD OF
ALLOCATING THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEDUCTION TO UTAH.

Kennecott in its 1967 and 1968 franchise tax returns
has allocated to Utah Federal Income Taxes as computed under the provisions of United States Treasury
Regulation 1.1502-33( d) (2). The Tax Commission disallowed Kennecott's computation of taxes, on the ground
that certain tax credits included in its federal tax computation were not allowable under Utah law, because
they represented tax losses arising outside the state.
Kennecott herein file consolidated returns pursuant
to the provisions of Section 59-13-23, UCA, 1953. Some
of the affiliated corporations whose income was reported
in said returns, reported net losses, which under Federal Regulations would entitle them to special tax alloca-
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tion treatment between other profit members of the
affiliated group for Federal tax purposes.
Under Federal law, for the purpose of determining
income and profit to affiliated corporations filing a
FPderal consolidated income tax return, the Federal
tax liability reflected by the consolidated return is to
be allocated among members of the group under one
of fom basic allocation methods provided by Treasury
HPg-ula ti on 1.1552-1 (a). The group must Pleet h? written
statement madP pursuant to Regulation 1.1552-1 (c)
which of these four methods it shall utilize, and if it
fails to make such an election, it is obligated to use
first or taxable income method. See Reg. 1.1552l ( d) .11
The fonr available basic allocation methods are as
follows:
1. The taxable income method. See Reg. 1.1552-l(a)
( 1).

2. The separate return liability method. See Reg.
1.1552-l(a) (2).
nFederal Regulation No. 1.1552-l(a) provides as follows:
"(a) General Rule. For the purpose of determining the earnings
and profits of each member of an affiliated group which is required to
be included on a consolidated return for such group filed for a taxable year beginning after December 31, 1953 and ending after August
16, 1954, the tax liability of the group shall be allocated among the
members of the group in accordance with whichever of the following
methods the group shall elect in its first consolidated return for such
taxable year:
(1) The tax liability shall be apportioned among the members of
the group in accordance with the ratio which that portion of the consolidated taxable income attributable to each member of the group
having taxable income bears to the consolidated taxable income."

3. The tax rncrease allocation method. See Reg.
1.1552-1 (a) (3).
4. Discretionary methods. See Reg. 1.1552-l(a) ( 4).
All taxpayers filing a Federal consolidated income
tax return must utilize one of the above basic methods.
However, in addition to these basic methods, certain
qualifying groups may also further allocate Federal
taxes as provided by Treasury Regulation 1.1502-33( d)
(2).

Such further allocation is grounded upon the fact
that when affiliated corporations join together for the
purpose of filing a consolidated tax return, it is generally agreed between them that profit members will
compensate loss members in amounts necessary to reflect
the fact that the profit members' tax would have been
greater if a loss member had not joined in the consolidation. These tax compensating or excess payments, made
by a profit to a loss member are treated by the Treasury
as either a dividend or capital contribution, depending
upon whether the payment is made from a profit parent
to a loss subsidiary, a profit subsidiary to a loss parent
or between subsidiaries themselves.
As a result, the member making such a payment is
not entitled to a tax deduction and the member receiving the payment may be taxed on the amount so received.
The Treasury Department has provided that corporations qualifying under Regulation 1.1502-33 (d) ( 2) may
treat these tax compensating payments as a deductible
tax payment, both to the profit member making the
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vayment and to the loss member receiving it. The resulting tax effect is obvious.
Kennecott now claims the right to allocate such a
resulting Federal tax liability to Utah as a deduction
under Treasury Regulation l.1502-33(d) (2). It should
be noted, however, that the procedure sought to be utilized by the taxpayer was not available under Federal
Law until December 31, 1965. See Reg. 1.1502-32. Prior
to that time, the tax treatment which the Taxpayer
seeks was not allowed by Federal Law. Utah Regulations have not changed during the period having been
enacted effective November 1, 1964. See Corporation
Franchise Tax, Reg. No. 13.
The Utah Statutes and Regulation in question provide as follows :
Section 59-13-3. "Every ... corporation, ... for
the privilege of exercising its corporate franchise
or for the privilege of doing business in the state,
shall annually pay to the state a tax equal to
six per cent of its net income for the proceeding
taxable year computed and allocated to this state
in the manner hereinafter provided . . . ."
Section 59-13-5 (1). "'Gross income' includes
services,
gains, profits and income derived
of whatever kind in whatever form paid, or from
trades, businesses, commerce or sales, or ·deali1:1gs
in property, whether real or
g.rowmg
out of the ownership or use of or mterest m such
property; also from
rent,
or
securities or the transaction of any busmess carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits
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and income derived from any other source whatever."
Section 59-13-7. "In computing net income there
shall be allowed as deductions :
Taxes Paid.

•

•

(3) Taxes paid or accrued within the taxable
year.... (Emphasis supplied)
Under each of the basic allocation methods established by Treasury Regulation 1.1552, the total taxes
as allocated to the group, cannot exceed the actual consolidated tax liabilityof the group. Seo Reg. 1.1552-1(2).
However, upon electing to use the additional allocation
method provided by Regulation 1.1502-33(d) (2), a taxpayer may allocate a total amount exceeding the groups'
actual tax liability for the year.
Kennecott argues that its allocation of Federal taxes
as between members is proper under the Federal Regulations and that the Tax Commission is obligated to
follow Federal Law and, therefore, that its method of
allocation should be accepted by the Commission.
There is neither statute nor regulation which appear
to obligate the Commission to follow or accept the allocation suggested by Kennecott. In this regard, it must
be noted:
(a) Gain or loss on inter-company transactions is
recognized for Federal Tax Purposes by Federal Regulations and these regulations have been adopted to pro-
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vide relief incident to such transactions.
1-1502-33(a): 1-1552-l(a).

See Regs.

( b) Gain or loss on inter-company transactions between affiliated corporations filing a consolidated Utah
return is not recognized. See Utah Reg. 4 (12).
It appears, therefore, that the Commission is not
confronted with the type of situation which the Federal
Regulations seek to resolve and has no reason to concern itself with, let alone follow them.

Tax Commission Regulation 4 (4) (b), conditions
the Tax Commission's acceptance of a consolidated return
upon the filing by the affiliated group of a Form 22,
wherein the group consents to the application of Utah
Regulations as adopted.
Regulation 13 ( 4) provides:
"(b) In general, the assignment of Federal Income Taxes shall be made only in those segments
of net income subject to Federal Income Tax and
shall be made on the basis of net income before
Federal Taxes . . . . "
The language of the Regulation therefor implies
that a member must have taxable income before being
allocated a Federal tax deduction.
The regulation continues:
" ( c) Federal income tax assignments are to be
made to profit producing items or divisions only.
Each profit producing item or division must be
assigned its proportionatf> share of the total allow-
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able Fedt>ral tax deduction, based on the ratio
that the income of such profit producing item
or division bears to the total of all profit producing items or divisions .... "
No cases have been found interpreting the meaning
of "items or divisions." However, a tax deduction is
allocated only as against gross income of the entity to
be taxed and the only entities with which the state
could here be concerned are the individual corporate
members making up the consolidated group. It would
appear to follow that this particular sub-paragraph of
the Regulation has reference to the allocation to member
corporations comprising the consolidated group. This
is completely contrary to the philosophy of Federal Regulation 1.1502-33 (b) which permits allocation to loss members.
The Utah Regulation further provides:
" ( c) . . . regardless of the mechanics used, the
total of the Federal tax assignments made against
the profit-producing items or divisions, regardless of where located or whether or not subject
to state income or franchise taxes, may not exceed the total corporate Federal tax liability for
the particular year involved (in case of an accrual
basis taxpayer), or the total amount paid (in the
case of a cash basis taxpayer)."
This provision is consistent with Federal Regulation
1.1552-1 but inconsistent with new Federal Regulation
l.1502-33(d) which does permit allocation of Federal
taxes in excess of the consolidated tax obligation of the
group. The Utah Regulation specifically prohibits the
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"red figure'' allocation contemplated by Federal Regulation 1.1502-33 ( d) and thereby specifically evidences that
the Tax Commission has adopted an allocation method
contrary to that contemplated by the Federal Regulation.
It should also be noted that the Utah Corporation
Tax Regulation 14 qualifies its provision that
the Tax Commission shall closely follow Federal requirements with respect to similar matters, by reciting
as follows:

"In some instances, of course, the Federal and
States' statutes differ and due to such conflict,
the Federal Rulings, Regulations and Decisions,
cannot be followed. Furthermore, in some instances, the Commission may disagree with the
Federal determinations and will not consider them
controlling for Utah Corporation franchise tax
purposes.''

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

"The following are among the items for which
different amounts or different treatments are
required under the State and Federal statutes :
( c) consolidated returns.

( e) net operating loss carry-overs or carrybacks. (Such deductions are not provided for
under the Utah Statute)."
Thus, it appears that Kennecott in filing a consolidated return in the State of Utah has agreed to be bound
by the Commission Regulations governing the filing of
such consolidated returns, including but not limited to
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Regulation 13. Under the provisions of Regulation 13,
no Federal tax can be assigned to loss items and Federal
Regulation 1.1502-33(d) (2) has no applicability.
Kennecott relies on the case of Cities Service Gas
Company and Cities Service Compa;ny v. McDonald,
204 Kansas 705, 446 P. 2d 277, and the cases therein
cited by the Kansas Court. All of these cases can be
distinguished from the present matter. In the Cities
Service case, the Court found that Cities Service Company was the parent and Cities Gas Company, a subsidiary of a consolidated group of corporations which
had filed a Federal consolidated tax return. Cities Gas
Company, in filing its Kansas corporate return, claimed
a Federal tax deduction for the total amount of the
tax which it would have been obligated to pay had it
not joined in the filing of the Federal consolidated
return, on which no Federal tax was actually paid by
the consolidated group.
Pursuant to agreement between the consolidated
group members, Cities Gas Company, along with all
other profit members of the group, forwarded to the
parent corporation, their check, payable to the parent,
in the amount of the Federal tax obligation they would
be required to bear had they not joined in the filing of
the consolidated return.
The total of the payments so received, were then
distributed by the parent company to the respective loss
members of the group on a prorata basis. Such distributions constituted compensating tax payments intended
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to reflect that the profit members' tax would have been
greater if the loss members had not joined them in
the c-onsolidation. The net result, was that Cities Gas
Company actually made a payment in an amount equal
to what its Federal tax obligation would have been had
it filed a separate tax return. However, such amount
was paid directly to the loss members of the consolidated
group rather than to the Federal Government.
The Kansas Court reaffirmed its decision rn
Northern Natural Gas Producing Company v. McCoy,
197 Kan. 740, 421 P. 2d 190, in which it held that a
deduction for Federal taxes would be allowed on the
Kansas return only to the extent of the Federal taxes
actually paid. In that case, the subsidiary corporation
had claimed a deduction for the amount it would have
been required to pay to the Federal Government had
it filed a separate, rather than a consolidated tax return.
This amount was substantially greater than tlw amount
of its obligation on a consolidated return basis. However, the subsidiary had not actually made payment of
any amount over and above its prorata share of the
amount owing on the Federal consolidated return.
The Court then stated that its opinion in the
Northern Natural Gas Producing case stood for the
proposition that the subsidiary corporation could only
deduct for Federal taxes, an amount which it had actually paid. The Court extended its decision and applied
it to the facts of the case then before it, holding that
the subsidiary was authorized to deduct its Federal

income tax liability incurred on a separate return basis
if the same was actually paid to the parent corporation.
The Court found that the subsidiary had, in fact, made
a payment in an amount equal to the claimed deduction
and the fact that the subsidiary's payment was "made
payable to Cities Service Company, instead of the Internal Revenue Service is wholly insignificant, for in either
case, the end result was the same."
The Kansas Court also referred to the case of
Trumk Line Gas Company v. Collector of Revenrue (La.
App. 1965) 182 So. 2d 67 4 in which the Louisiana CoU(rt
allowed a Federal income tax deduction only in the
amount of an allocable share of the tax liability indicated
by the Federal consolidated return, rather than the
greater amount for which the Taxpayer there would
have been liable had it filed on a separate return basis.
The Kansas court distinguished the Trunk Line case
on the ground that Louisiana had enacted a regulation
authorized by statute which permitted a Federal tax
deduction only in an amount equal to the prorata share
of the corporation's tax liability generated by the consolidated return. In determining the case before it, the
Kansas Court held that the entire Federal tax which
the subsidiary would have been required to pay on a
separate return basis was deductible on its Kansas
income tax return, as it had received no tax saving or
lienefit inC'ident to the transacton with its parent company.
The present case can be distinguished from the
Kansas case in that the Kansas Court refused to apply
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the ruling of the Trunk Line Gas Company case because
the Court, in that case, had a state regulation to which
it could look for the basis of its determination. N 0
regulation of any sort was before the Kansas Court.
'rhe Kansas Court in no way disagreed with the reasoning adopted in the Trimk Line Gas Compawy case and,
therefore, it may be presumed that the Kansas Court
would not have been adverse to making a similar decision had the facts before it indicated the existence of
a Kansas regulation providing for the allocation and
deduction of Federal taxes.
Generally, it has been assumed that an allocable
portion of the Federal taxes of a multi-state corporation
should be deducted from gross income in order to arrive
at usable "net income" under Utah law. See K e'n!necott
Copper Corp. v. State Tax Commission,1 2 118 Utah 140,
221 P. 2d 857; New Park Miming Co. v. State T(JJJ; Commission, 113 Utah 410, 196 P. 2d 485.
The Commission's position is best justified by the
underlying purpose of the Franchise Tax Act. In order
that allocation can reach its final aim of net income to
be assigned to the State of Utah, it is first necessary
to either assign items of deductions to items of gross
income and to allocate resulting net income to Utah or
else to apportion items of deductions separatel_y and
120n1y an allocated portion of Federal taxes were involved in the
Kennecott Copper case. See page 10 of the Defendant's Brief, which
indicates that Federal taxes of Kennecott were allocated to Utah, ?Dd
page 6 of Plaintiff's reply Brief to Plaintiffs_ Petition
which quotes Commission instructions then m
limiting Federal
tax deductions to those applicable to property m Utah.

dt•duct them from net income attributable to Utah. This
is what the auditing division has done by attributing
incomt' to the Utah Copper Division as part of the deficiency assessment herein, and, thereafter, ascertaining
items of deduction.
Deductions should be subject to the same geographical limitations m; the gross income to which they are
attributed. If only inrome directly allocable or attributto this state is taxable, and this is the rule established by American Investment Conipany i:. State Tax
Commission, 101 Utah 189, 120 P. 2d 331, 337, then only
items arising ·within the state or allocable there to should
he allowed as deductions if true net income is to be
ascertained. See Altman and Keesling, Allocation of
Income in State Taxation, page 177.
As Tax Commission Regulation No. 13 and the audit
deficiency achieve this result, and as the purpose of
the Franchise Tax Act is to tax net income attributable
to Utah, it would appear proper to disallow any deduction which would tend to distort reportable net income.
No double taxation results from the Commission's refusal to allow deductions not directly attributable to
Utah inconw. Tax compensating payments made between
affiliated subsidiaries of Kennecott are neither taxes
paid under the definition provided by the Utah statute
nor are they attributable to Utah income. To adopt the
view of the Kansas Court and allow 31lch payments as
deductions against Utah income is to overturn the pattern of tax compliance established by the New Park
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Mining and Kennecott cases and promote new controversy and litigation. Kennecott in such event would be
given a tax advantage unknown to any others and
unauthorized by law. This should not be done unless
the Commission's position is untenable.

(i-!
POINT IV
KENNECOTT HAS IMPROPERLY COMPUTED ITS
DEPLETION ALLOWANCE FOR THE YEARS 1967
AND 1968.

The question presented hereby is the manner of
computing the depletion allowance to which Kennecott
is entitled under the Utah Statute. On its consolidated
returns, as filed, Kennecott has deducted the cost of
transportation, smelting, refining and other post mining
activities from the reported net income from the property before applying the statutory factor applicable to
depletion.
The difference between the parties' approach to
the depletion allowance is best illustrated by the following comparative tables using figures from Kennecott's 1967 consolidated return:

TABLE I

Kennecott's Position With Regard to Depletion
1.

Item
36, 441, 832

2.
3.

-3, 061, 389
33, 380, 443

4. -1, 800, 736
5.
31, 579, 707
6. -10, 526, 569

Explanation
1. Kennecotts beginning figure set forth in
its Brief, at p. 130 13
2. Subtraction of refining profits
3. Denominated by Kennecott as net income from the property. 14
4. Less Federal taxes and miscellaneous
5. The depletable base.
6. Less the depletion deduction (33-%3)
which is added to the depletion
allowances of other group members and
other deductions to arrive at net income
subject to allocation by formula

13Notwithstanding Kennecott.s reference to "TR 466" and "Exhibit
'P' at TR 691" the records show the figure at this point to be $33,380 443. Kennecott for purposes of argument herein has added back
the' sum of $3,061,389 to obtain its beginning figure above.
.
14This figure is also the "depletable base" in Pl Br p. 130 but tlus
is not the position of the returns as evidenced by R. 405.
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TABLE II
'l'he Commissions Position With Regard to Depletion 15
1.

Item
33, 380, 443

Explanation

1. Income within and without the State of

2.
-714, 953
3. -11, 051, 683

2.
3.

4.

21, 613, 807

4.

5.

-7, 204, 602

5.

Utah attributable to the Utah mine
but including post mining profitsie
Less related federal taxes.
Less post mining profits from transporting smelting, refining, and selling, as
per previous court decisions by applythe apportionment fraction to determine income without the State and
consequently not from the property
for depletion purposes.
Net income from the property and the
depletable base.
Less the depletion deduction (33-%%)
to which is added income or losses
of other group members allocated to
Utah to arrive at the group's total
income allocated to Utah.

The Commission found that post mining costs were
not properly deducted by Kennecott in computing net
income from the property for depletion purposes. The
issue, therefore, is what the law requires when it provides in Section 59-13-7 (8) and (9), UCA, 1953:
"Depletion
(8) In the case of mines, oil and gas wells,
other natural deposits, and timber, a reason,.
able allowance for depletion and for depreciation
if improvements, according to the peculiar conditions in each case; such reasonable allowance in
all cases to be made 1111der rules and regulations
to be prescribed by the tax commission. In the
1sJn general see (R. 600, 691).
t&See

Conclusions 18, 19 and 20 (R. 689).

case of leases, the deduction shall be equitably
apportioned between the lessee and the lessor."
(Emphasis added)
"Basis for Determining Depreciation, Depletion,
etc.
( 9) (a) The basis upon which depletion, depreciation, exhaustion, wear and tear, and obsolescence are to be allowed in respect of any property shall be the same as is provided in Section
59-13-13 for the purpose of determining the gain
or loss upon the sale or other disposition of such
property, except as hereinafter in this section
provided."
"Percentage Allowance for Depletion
(b) The allowance for depletion shall be
thirty-three and one-third per cent of the net
income from the property during the taxable year,
computed without allowance for depletion, or on
the basis provided in subsection (9) (a), as the
taxpayer may elect. The basis which the taxpayer
elects under this subsection shall be the basis
used in subsequent accounting periods and shall
be changed thereafter only with the consent of
the tax commission." (Emphasis added)

It becomes readily apparent that any allowance for
depletion to which Kennecott is entitled is available only
under rules and regulations prescribed by the Tax Commission ,except where the statute provides for such a
determination. Tax Commission Regulation No. 12, in
this respect, provides :
"Depletion on the percentage basis is all?wable
only on the net income from the extraction of
the crude mineral product from the ground. No
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depletion may be claimed or allowed on the net
inc?n_ie derived from post-extractive, smelting,
refmmg, fabricating or similar activities. Included in the extractive processes are the actual
digging or removal of the crude ore or other
mineral product from the ground, transportation
to mill, grinding, flotation, or similar concentrating processes. In the absence of established
market or field prices of the crude mineral product or concentrates, net income will be apportioned between extractive and non-extractive
activities in proportion to the costs incurred in
performing these functions.

In general, gross income from the property is
the amount of the proceeds from the sale of the
crude mineral product or concentrates, if sold,
or the market or field price of such crude mineral
product or concentrates, if further processed
prior to sale. Net income from the property must
hP com1mtt·d hy deducting from gross income
from the property all deductions allowed by statute in computing taxable net income (excluding
any allowance for depletion) to the extent that
they are applicable to the property. The requisite
deductions shall include overhead and operating
expenses, development costs to extent claimed or
allowed as a deduction on the return, depreciation, taxes, including federal income taxes, losses
sustained, etc. In cases where the taxpayer engages in activities in addition to, or derives income
from sources other than, mineral extraction, deductions not directly attributed to any particular
activity or source of income shall be fairly allocated."
In Kennecott Copper Company v. State Tax Commission, No. 7298, 118 Utah 140, 221 P. 2d 857, the issue

was whether net income, if derived from transportation,
smelting, refining and selling, should be deducted from
the net income of the Utah Copper Division before
applying the statutory depletion allowance. The Court
stated:
"The problem that is unique and that is brought
into focus by this operation is that by statute,
depletion is limited to that income received from
the property, and the post mining operations of
Kennecott invade the fields not usually associated
with extraction and sale of ores. Kennecott claims
that the costs of all these post mining activities
should be charged against its gross income to
arrive at its net income for depletion purposes,
but that no net income is attributable to these
post mining operations." Page 154.
The Court continued, referring to the post mining
activities of the Taxpayer:
"Here, however, we go far beyond that as Kennecott is the owner from the time of digging to
the day of selling. Undoubtedly each of the post
mining processes appreciates the value of the
product and this is reflected in increasing the net
income to Kennecott. If the total net income were
allocated to the state, then we might be faced
with the difficult question as to whether we were
not on the one hand permitting the post mining
operations to increase the franchise tax due the
state and on the other hand denying the taxpayer
the right to the increased income for depletion
computations. However, when the taxpayer
cates the net income received from the appreciation to out of state net income, another question
presents itself." Page 156.

G9
"We cast aside any attempt to reconcile the differences in total net income, as we believe our
will make it possible for the parties to
determrne the exact amount. We believe that if
the taxpayer claims that all net income is not
earned in this state, that the portion allocated
to business done outside this state must, of necessity, not be income from the property within the
meaning of our statute ... therefore, if any net
income is attributable to business done elsewhere,
it must come from operations which would not
be considered ordinary treatment processes normally applied by operators. The taxpayer in this
instance is in the rather inconsistent position to
assert that net income pertaining to income performed outside this state can be considered as
net income from the property. By splitting its
income between this state and other places, the
taxpayer has established that it can assign portions of its income to mining operations and to
post mining activities.
"We need not place our approval on the formula
used by the commission or arbitrarily determine
the break through point between mining operations and post mining activities. All we need do
in this case is to point out that there are two
possible paths for the taxpayer to take. The
commission might agree that it take either but
it cannot traverse both. Either the net income
is from property and should be allocated to this
state, or the net income is from both the property
and the post mining activities and they are not
so related that the net income cannot be roughly
allocated to both sources." P. 158.
The Tax Commission submits the K c1m.pcott Copper
case, No. 7298, stands for tlw proposition that the por-
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tion of net income allocated to business done outside
this state is not income from the property and if it is
not income from the property, then that income cannot
be used in computing the depletion allowance.
Kennecott claims that if the Tax Commission excludes post mining activities from net income, because
they are performed out of the state, that there has been
a prior allocation of business or income before the computation of the depletion allowance. It is obvious however that post mining activities must be excluded regardless of where they are performed.
The Commission has adopted the proposition that
depletion is a deduction utilized in determining income
prior to the allocation of business. The total income
in and out of the state, less applicable deductions including the deduction for depletion is the net income subject
to allocation.
The Tax Commission utilizes income from the Utah
business as the starting point for its depletion compensation. This income figure taken from the Taxpayer's
own returns, includes income from post mining operations and is subject to a reasonable allowance for depletion. The Commission, using Kennecott's own figures,
then has excluded any income related to post mining
activities. This exclusion has been done by means of
a formula allocating a proportionate share of the income
from the Utah property as reported by Kennecott to its
out-of-state operations. This formula method has been
used before as a device for separating mining and post
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mining income. The Commission knows no more fair
way to allocate post mining costs except by direct separate accounting and the figures to accomplish such an
allocation by this means have not been furnished by
Kennecott.
Excluding the proportionate share of post mining
income from Kennecott's claimed depletion allowance, the
Tax Commission has computed a depletion figure which
has been subtracted, together with other applicable deductions from the gross income from Utah business to
arrive at a net income from the property figure. The
audit deficiency, as modified by the Commission, allows
one-third of this amount as a depletion allowance from
the property.
A similar position was taken by the taxpayer in
K ewnecott Copper Corporation v. State Tax Commission, No. 8091, 5 Utah 2d 306, 301 P. 2d 562. The Court
in construing the issue there presented stated at page
318:
"Basing its computation upon the premise that
the property upon which a depletion allowance
was available to the taxpayer was merely the
mining property, the wasting asset itself although
the net income from the property was not determinable since processing and sale contributed
an indefinable amount to the profits, the Commission devised a formula relating mining costs
and attributing income to the two operations in
the same ratio."
The Court then quoted the previous statement of
Case No. 7298, set forth above, and stated:

"Kennecott claims that by t:iubjecting a depletion
allowance of one-third of its total net income
from the Utah Division to the allocation formula
it achieves a resulting figure that
one-third of the net income from business attributable to Utah. However, it requires no particular
mathematical acumen to observe that this method
of compution allows a depletion deduction upon
vost-mining activities in other states which Kennecott asserts are responsible for producing about
one-third of its net income, regardless of whether
the depletion calculation or the allocation to Utah
is made first.
Depletion is a statutory grace allowed in the
determination of net income prior to the allocation of business without and within Utah, just
as are costs and expenses, taxes and losses. These
items are deducted from the gross income regardless of where the property or personnel earning
the income are located, and the difference between gross income and these deductible items is
the net income from which is determined the
income allocable to the State of Utah.
If depletion were based upon an appraisal at the
mine of the devaluation of the property due to
the past year's activities, that amount would
simply be deducted from the total net income.
Because of the extensiveness of both the mine
and the activities of the corporation, it is necessary to determine the value of the mine in producing. income by reference to an allocation formula.
Thert>fore, the devaluation of the mine, when related by statute to that income, must be based
upon the same formula for consistency's sake.

Under the formula, Kennecott alloeates to Utah
approximately two-thirds of its net income as

,.....,
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the value of its franchise in this State. Since its
rntin· artivitif's within this State are concerned
with mining, this figure must represent the net
income from the mining propertv. One-third of
this amount is allowed as a depietion deduction
to be claimed from gross income in computing
net income which is the basis for the allocation
formula.
The Commission specifically rejected the view
that depletion should in any way be computed
with respect to the apportionment fraction, except
for purposes of comparison. The reasons for so
doing are clearly set forth in the Commission's
findings. It states that the variable factors concerned with the assignment of income to Utah
have no relation to depletion which should be
33-% % of an amount representing the gross value
of the mineral at the mine, less mining costs and
applicable Federal taxes. Concededly, this view
is possibly valid where applied to corporations
marketing their products in different ways, but
this is a question which we need not here determine. The problem here is to determine what the
value of the mine is in relation to the earning
of net income, and the ceiling upon a lfa depletion allowance is set by the amount of income
attributable to this state where the only property
concerned in the computation is the mining property located here and granted the allowance by
statute. pp. 319-320"
There appears to be no question but that Kennecott's proposed method of computing its depletion allowance is res adjudicata having been disallowed by this
Court on two previous occasions. The facts supporting
the Tax Commission's disallowance of post-mining costs
are substantially unchanged in the instant case.

7-±

The only justification for the Taxpayer raising the
question a third time is possibly in the context of the
depletion allowance to which a group of affiliated taxpayers is properly entitled.
Kennecott apparently claims that because not all
of its reported "net income from the Utah property"
was earned within this state that the portion not so
earned cannot be included as "net income from the
property" for the purpose of computing the depletion
allowance.
But the two quoted terms are not the same. The
net income from the property figure from Kennecott's
returns is either income from Utah without necessity
of apportionment or it is subject to apportionment because it is not all earned in Utah and hence not from
the property. In the latter event, Kennecott should not
be allowed to claim 1;3 of the entire amount as a depletion deduction under established case law.
As the Utah Statute specifically provides that the
depletion allowance is to be one-third of the net income
from the property during the taxable year and as the
taxpayers' returns recognize this principle and specifically report income from the property in Utah, it is
difficult for the Commission to perceive why the additional factor of the consolidated return would require
a different result than that already dictated by the
Court.
It is submitted therefore, that the audit deficiency
with respect to the method of computing the depletion
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allowance to which Kennecott is entitled should be sustained.
POINT V
THE COMMISSION DID NOT DENY KENNECOTT
THE RIGHT TO FILE A CONSOLIDATED RETURN.

A - The Effect of a Consolidated Return

Kennecott's position with regard to the consolidated
returns herein is based upon a faulty premise. On numerous pages in its Brief it claims that the Tax Commission has "unconsolidated" the parent Kennecott
Copper Corporation from the anonymity of the affiliated
group 11 or that the group itself is a new taxpayer having
all the rights and immunities of such. 18
The fundamental question in this regard is what
is the effect of a consolidated
The answer of
long standing appears to have been overlooked or disregarded by Kennecott.
Kennecott quotes various authorities on pages 28-35
of its brief purportedly in support of its theory that
the filing of a consolidated return brings into being a
new taxable entity. A careful reading of these authorities however discloses that corporate lines are not erased
nor is a new taxpaying unit created by the filing of a
consolidated return. All authorities admit that fot some
purposes affiliated corporations are to be regarded as
one unified entity or company. See Bennett Association
11p}. Br. p. 14, 15, 29, 33, 35, 40, 41, 46, 91, 92, 93, 95-101, 115
isPJ. Br. p. 13, 14, 16, 24, 26, 27, 29, 32, 34, 42, 43, 45, 46

v. Utah State Tax Commission, 19 Utah 2d 108, 426
P. 2d 812. However, the clear majority of decisions is
that no new taxable entity or taxpayer is created by the
filing of a consolidated return.
Section 59-13-23, U.C.A. 1953 provides m part:
"59-12-23 Consolidated returns.
By Affiliated Group.
(l)An affiliated group of banks and/or other
corporations shall, subject to the provisions of
this section, have the privilege of making a consolidated return for any taxable year in lieu of
separate returns. The making of a consolidated
return shall be upon the condition that all the
corporations which have been members of the
affiliated group at any time during the taxable
year for which the return is made consent to all
the regulations under subsection (2) of this section prescribed prior to the making of such return; and the making of a consolidated return
shall be considered as such consent. In the case
of a bank or other corporation which is a member
of the affiliated group for a fractional part of
the year, the consolidated return shall include
the income of such bank and/or other corporation
for such part of the year as it is a member of
the affiliated group.
Rules and Regulations.
(2) The tax commission shall prescribe such
regulations as it may deem necessary in order
that the tax liability of an affiliated group of
banks and/or corporations making a consolidated
return and of each corporation in the group, both
ditring and after the period of affiliation, may
be determined, computed, assessed, collected and
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in such manner as clearly to reflect the
mcome and to prevent avoidance of tax liability."
(Emphasis supplied)
In the Bcnnrtt Association case, s11pra, this Court
said:
"Section 59-13-23, UCA 1953 and Re()"nlation
Article 34 implementing it, giving affiliated corporations the privilege of making a consolidated
return, date from 1931. They were taken almost
verbatim from the 1928 U. S. Internal Revenue
Code and Regulations. Therefore, reference to
cases interpreting the Federal Statute and Regulations is helpful." 19 Utah 2d 111
The question of the effect of a consolidated return
upon individual members of the affiliated group and
whether a new taxable entity is created thereunder has
been discussed in several federal cases where the statute
was similar or identical to Utah's.
In Helverin.g v. Morgans, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 55
S.Ct. 60, 79 L. ed 232, a corporation becoming affiliated
with another filed a consolidated return for the portion
of its taxable year subsequent to affiliation in accordance
with Section 240 of the Revenue Act of 1926, in response
to the question of whether a new taxpayer was created,
the Court said at page 127: "After affiliation, as before,
the affiliated corporation, although filing consolidated
returns, continued to be separate taxable units. The
consolidated returns operated only to unite them for
the purpose of tax computation and the equitable apportionment between them of the tax thus computed.

'J'he C'omt cited Woolford Realty Co. c. Rose, 28G
U.S. 32.'l, ;)2 S. Ct.
7G L. l'd 11 :12. There, urnler the
same statute and a similar set of facts the effect of a
consolidated return was again discussed as follows :
"The fact is not to be ignored that each of two
or more corporations joining (nncler Nee. 240) in
a cons?li?ated rf'tnrn is nonetheless a taxpa)·er.
Commissioner v. Ben Ginsburg Co. (C.C.A. 2d)
54 F. 2d 238, 239. By the express terms of the
statute (Sec 240 b) the tax when computed is to
be assessed, in the absence of agreement to the
contrary, upon the respective affiliated corporations 'on the basis of the net income properly
assignable to each.' " The term 'taxpayer' means
any person subject to the tax imposed by this
act. A corporation does not cease to be such a
person by affiliating with another.'' 286 U.S.
p. 328
In the case of Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States,
(6th Cir.) 120 F. 2d 136, cert. den. 315 U.S. 797, 62 S. Ct.
488, Louisville ·woolen Milt:,, filed a claim for abaternPnt
of taxes, asking that collection be postponed until after
its claim had been reviewed and posted a bond to secure
payment. Without acting on the claim the commissioner
requested that a consolidated return be filed. Louisville
and its parent complied. After reviewing the affairs of
the affiliated group the commissioner proposed a deficienc)- assessment against the parent only, and attempted
to enforce collection against the bond.
The defendant bonding company sought to avoid
liability by claiming that the consolidated return resulted
in a new taxpayer. The Court said:

"That . . . a consolidated return was filed ...
did not alter the status of Louisville as a taxnor did it release the surety from its obligation upon its bond. An affiliated group filing
return becomes a tax computing
a
umt. It is not a taxable unit." p. 138. See also
Commissioner v. Ben Ginsburg Co., (2nd Cir.)
54 F. 2d 238; Sweets & Co. v. Commissioner (2nd
Cir.) 40 F. 2d 436; Swift & Co. v. United States,
(Ct. CL) 38 F. 2d 365, 379.
All of these cases were decided under Federal
statutes substantially similar to Sec. 59-13-23, U.C.R.
1953. 19
The inescapable conclusion therefore is that Kennecott Copper Corporation and its affiliates doing business in Utah (herein denominated "Kennecott") do not
become a new tax paying entity by filing a consolidated
return. Rather they are only a new tax reporting unit.
The Commission is not therefore 'un-consolidating'
the group when it detennines that the business activity
of one of its members, i.e. the parent Kennecott Copper
Corporation, is not fairly represented on the consolidated return. In the words of the U.S. Supreme Court
in Woolford Realty Co. 1;s. Rose, Kennecott Copper CorJioration "dot>s not cease to be such a person (a taxpayer)
by affiliating with another."
The affiliated corporations, though filing consolidated returns, continue to be separate taxable units.
Consolidated returns operate only to unite them for
iDSee 26 USCA Sec. 1501, for historical notes and annotat.ed cases
under this Section.
·

so
purposes of tax computations and apportionment between them of the tax thus computed. See Helvering
v. Morgan (supra).
Where a consolidated return as filed when subjected to the allocation and apportionment provisions of
the Uniform Act does not result in a fair representation
of the taxpayer's business activity in this State, the
Commission may require the employment of any other
method calculated to effectuate a reasonable allocation
and apportionment of the taxpayers income.
Thus the Commission's deficiency assessment which
m effect says to the tax reporting group "you have
under reported the activities of one of your members,
you should pay more" is completely consistent with
the theory of consolidated returns.
The Commission has determined that the allocation
and apportionment provisions of the Uniform Act, when
applied to Kennecott's (the affiliated group's) reported
business activity do not fairly represent the extent of
that business activity in this State. The extent of the
unfair representation of business activity is the admitted
activity of one of Kennecott's members, i.e. the parent
Kennecott Copper Corporation.
The commission submits that to propose a deficiency against the tax reporting group based on the
admitted business activity of one of its members in this
state is not to "unconsolidate" Kennecott in theory or
in fact. Such action does not deny to it any fundamental
rio·hts or imrnnnities inherent in a consolidated return.
b
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In fact the only new right accorded an affiliated group
by the consolidated return statute is that of reporting
the combined tax liability of individual members of the
group on one return.

B-The Applicability of 59-13-17 to Kennecott's Returns
Section 59-13-17, U.C.A. 1953 provides:
In any case of two or more corporations (whether
or not organized or doing business in this State,
and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the tax commission is authorized to distribute, apportion or allocate gross income or
deductions between or among such corporations,
if it determines that such distribution apportionment or allocation is necessary in order to prevent
evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income
of any of such corpomtions." (Emphasis added)
This section is patterned after present language in
26 U.S.C.A., Sec. 482 and many States have adopted
similar laws governing the apportionment of income
of affiliated taxpayers.
Under such statutes the Tax Commission or other
assessing officer is given great discretion as to the
method of distributing such income as long as it does
not attempt to tax income which in fact is not income
for tax purposes. See 85 C.J.S. Taxation, Sec. 1103,
p. 84; Wisconsin Ornamental Iron & Bronze Co. v. Wiscu11sin Tax Commission, 202 Wis. 355, 233 N.W. 72;
Rothschild & Co. v. Commissioner, 270 Minn. 245, 133
N.W. 2d 524.

<.!•)
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The importance of the power granted by this and
similar sections has been the subject of comment by
noted authorities. Altman & Keesling in their book
Allocation of Income in State Taxation, C.C.H. 1946
state:
"If tax laws are to be administered fairly and
in accordance with their intent, the administrative agencies must have a free hand to deal adequately with (transactions between related or controlled corporations avoiding tax liability). In
fact the need is so great and the consequences in
the absence of such power would be so disastrous,
that it would be reasonable to conclude that the
existence of such power is an inseparable corollary
of the duty and responsibility to administer the
law according to its terms."

"[Some] states have adopted provisions specifically granting the administrator authority to
apportion income and deductions between and
among affiliated, related, and controlled taxpayers and to otherwise make adjustments in
the case of transactions between taxpayers in
order to prevent tax avoidance." Op. cit. pp.
161-162
The authors then analyze a number of statutes including Utah's and conclude:
"(Utah has) elaborate and detailed provisions
which are apparently designed to give the
administrator the broadest possible freedom m
adjusting income and deductions between and
among affiliated, related or controlled
and in determining the income reasonably attnbutable to the taxing State." (Emphasis supplied)
p. 169
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Kennecott vigorously claims that present federal
regulations specifically preclude the application of Section 482 (and presumably its counterpart, Sec. 59-13-17,
U.C.A. 1953) from apportioning income or deductions
among the members of an affiliated gronp filing a
consolidated return. In support of this contention it
mis(p!Oh's 'l'reasmy RPgulations, SPc·. 1.482-l(b) (2) on

p. 38 of its brief without reference to its unindicated
d('letion of the first sentence of subsection (h) (2). The
entire subsection provides:
"Section 482 and this Section apply to the case
of any controlled taxpayer, whether such taxpayer makes a separate or a consolidated return.
If a controlled taxpayer makes a separate return,
the determintion is of its true separate taxable
income. If a controlled taxpayer is a party to a
consolidated return, the true consolidated taxable
income of the affiliated group and the true separate taxable income of the controlled taxpayer
are determined consistently with the principles
of a consolidated return." (Emphasis added)
In other words Section 482 and Section 59-13-17
are available to impeach the consolidated income figures
of a consolidated return.

The Commission has determined it is necessary to
re-apportion or allocate the income of various members
of Kennecott in order to prevent tax evasion or to
clearly reflect the income of any of such corporations.
As has been indicated the Utah Franchise Tax is
a tax on the right to do business as a corporation in
this State. It is measured by net income. Income derived

from business done outside the State cannot be included
in the tax base. However, income derived from business
done within the State is taxable and should bear the
same tax rate whether reported separately or through
a consolidated return.
Kennecott Copper Corporation reported $54,927,663.45 net income from the Utah mine in 1966 and
assigned to Utah after depletion and other deductions
the sum of $32,630,575.36 as net taxable income assignable to business done in Utah. (R. 663, 658)
For the year 1967, Kennecott Copper Corporation,
now a member of an affiliated group reported $33,380,443.69 as taxable income from the property in Utah,
but the group only assigned to Utah, after depletion
and other deductions the sum of $4,645,102.31 as net
income assignable to business done in Utah. (R. 466, 420)
Similarly, in 1968, Kennecott reported $58,178,300. 70
as taxable income from the Utah property, but assigned
to Utah, after depletion and other deductions the sum
of $7,763,163.36 as net income assignable to business
done in Utah. (R. 525, 488)
Thus, Kennecott contends that notwithstanding increasing income from its Utah activities the value of
its franchise is significantly less because it is now consolidated.
If the value of the franchise is measured by net
income from business done in Utah and the business
income of Kennecott during 1967 and 1968 is the same
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or more than in 1966, it is not to be presumed that the
franchise decreased in value during these years. Nevertheless the tax paid to Utah decreased approximately
90% in 1967 over what it had been in 1966. This decrease is attributable to a significantly lesser income
being assigned to Utah by the consolidated return than
that in fact resulting from Kennecott's Utah activities
for the taxable years in question.
The Commission submits that the allocation of more
income to Kennecott Copper Corporation and consequently to Kennecott as a tax reporting affiliated group
is necessary to truly reflect the net income of the members of the group in Utah and to prevent the evasion
of taxes on the right to do business in this State measured by income in this State. Such a procedure is justified by Section 59-13-17, U.C.A. 1953, as well as 59-13-95,
U.C.A. 1953.
POINT VI
INTEREST SHOULD NOT BE WAIVED ON THE
INSTANT DEFICIENCY ASSESSMENT AND THE
COMMISSIONS FAILURE TO DO SO DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

Although Section 59-13-57, U.C.A. 1953 does authorize the Commission to waive, reduce or compromise
interest, there has been no showing of adequate grounds
for such action herein. Kennecott's claim that _it only
exercised its statutory right to file consolidated returns
is belied by its attack on the Commission's Regulations
and its disregard of previous decisions of this Court
in computing its depletion allowance.

If Kennecott has improperly computed its tax liability on its returns then there is a tax due and owing
the State of Utah. Kennecott should not be heard to
complain if interest is assessed on a tax deficiency as
is provided by law.

Most of the cases cited by Kennecott in this regard
have to do with the propriety of waiving penalties where
tliel'e is a bonafide dispute between the taxing authority
and the taxpayer. By its decision below the Tax Commission in fact waived all penalties 20 and interest except
the simple interest required to be imposed on deficiency
assessments by Section 59-13-28, U.C.A. 1953.
It is generally held that in the absence of some
inequity a taxpayer litigates the validity of his taxes at
his peril. An unsuccessful contest of tax liability after
taxes are due and payable subjects the taxpayer to
statutory interest for non-payment. See 85 C.J.S. Taxation, Sec. 1054, p. 639; Spencer v. Babylon R. Co.,
N.Y. 250 F. 24, 162 CCA 196; Morriso'flrKnudson v State
Board of Equaliziation, 58 Wyo. 500, 135 P. 2d 927.

Essentially the same argument now made by Kennecott was presented by the taxpayer in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 5 Utah 2d 306,
301 P. 2d 562. This Court there refused to abate interest
on amounts which were determined to be properly within
the deficiency. The Court cited 85 C.J.S., Taxation, Sec.
1054 as authority for its holding, "We see no reason
20See Conclusion No. 24, R. 690.

87
for interfering with the Commission's discretion in the
matter of interest."
POINT VII
TAX COMMISSION REGULATION NUMBER 13 IS
VALIDLY PROMULGATED.

Aside from the applicability of Regulation 13 which
was asserted by Kennecott below, it is now contended
for the first time on appeal that the regulation is void
in that the Commisson had no authority to promulgate
it. (For Argument below see (R. 8, 698, 722, 723, 773777); Kennecott's Brief pp. 115-120.
Kennecott's contentions notwithstanding, the authority of the State Tax Commission to promulgate regulations is grounded generally in Section 59-5-46. This
section provides in part:
"General powers and duties. - The po-wers and
duties of the State Tax Commission are as follows:
(2) To prescribe rules and regulations not
in conflict with the Constitution and laws of this
State for its own government and the transaction of its business."
Responsibility to administer the corporation franchise tax is given to the Tax Commission by Chapter 13
of Title 59 U.C.A. 1953. No one could seriously contend
that the regulation of corporate business deductions is
not the "business" of the Commission.
Kennecott's lengthy assertion that the Commission
has no power to enact Regulation 13, is totally without

foundation. To raise the question for the first time on
appeal is unauthorized by both law and good practice.
It has long been the law of this State that legal
questions cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
See Salt Lake Invetment Co. v. Fox, 37 Utah 334, 108
Pac. 1132; In Re Jones Estate, 99 Utah 373, 104 P. 2d
210; Radlfy v. Smith, 6 Utah 2d 314, 313 P. 2d 465;
Chief Consolidated JJJining Co. v. Indi1strial Commission,
78 Utah 447, 4 P. 2d 1083.

An analogous case ·wherein language substantially
identical to Seetion 59-13-23 was constn[(-'d is Allstate
lnsitrance Company v. United States (7th Cir.) 329 F. 2d
346. There the question involved the right of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to promulgate a regulation requiring parent and subsidiary to be on the same
calendar year. The Taxpayer contended that it had an
unqualified right to file a consolidated return and that
therefore any regulation restricting such right was
invalid.
The Court referred to Section 141 of the Revenue
Code 21 and said:
21Revenue Act 1928, Section 141:
"(a) An affiliated group of corporations shall, subject to the provisions of this Section, have the privilege of making a consolidated
return for the taxable year 1929 or any subsequent taxable year, in
lieu of separate returns. The making of a consolidated return shall
be upon the condition that all the corporations which have been
members of the affiliated group _ _ . consent to all the regulations
under Subsection (b) prescribed prior to the making of such return.
(b) Regulations. The Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, shall prescribe such regulations as he may deem necessaq' in
order that the tax liability of an affiliated group of corporations
making a consolidated return and of each corporation in the group
. _ _ may be determined _ _ . in such a manner as clearly to reflect
the income and to prevent avoidance of tax liability_"
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"Section 141 (a) and (b) represents a broad
delegation of legislative power to issue regulations having the force of statute. The regulations
here involved are not merely interpretive regulations. . . . A very broad delegation has been
made in Section 141(a) in conditioning the privilege of filing consolidated returns on consent to
the Treasury Regulations promulgated pursuant
to Section 141 (b). Thus the regulations so promulgated become legislative in character having
tlw force and pffect of law, so long as they were
reasonably adopted (as these are) to the administration and enforcement of the act and did not
contravene some statutory provision." (citing
cases)
The Commission snbrnits that Regulation 13 is validly promulgated under both Sections 59-5-46 and 5913-23, U.C.A. 1953 notwithstanding the fact that it disputes Kennecott's right to challenge the validity of the
regulation on appeal.
POINT VIII
THE DEFICIENCY ASSESSMENT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OR THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND DOES NOT SUBJECT KENNECOTT TO DOUBLE TAXATION.

'rhe Ptah franchisP tax is a lirivilege tax on the
right to do business in this state measured by net income.
Income derived from business done outside the state
eannot be included in the tax base. Amerioan Investment Corp. v. State Tew; Commission, 101 Utah 189,
120 P. 2d 331; J. M. & 111. 8. Rrowning Co. L'. Stat!: Tax
Commission, 107 Utah 457, 154 P. 2d 993 In other words

)()

the value of the franchise for tax purposes is based on
income attributable to business done within this state.
Such franchise or privilege is taxed at a rate of six
percent of the corporation's net income computed and
allocated to this state . . . " 59-13-3, U.C.A. 1953 (Emphasis supplied).
In the case of corporations doing business in more
than one state the tax is imposed upon the portion of
a multi-state corporation's net income assignable or
allocable to business done within Utah. See 59-13-78-97,
U.C.A. 1953. ThP enifonu Ad }ll'O\"idPS for an allocation formula designed to determine the portion of
the taxpayer's business taxable by this State. It further
stipulates that if the allocation and apportionment provisions of the Act do not fairly represent the extent
of the taxpayer's business activity in the state that the
Commission may require another methods reasonably
calculated to do so. Thus the manifest intention of the
Utah Legislature is to impose the franchise tax upon
that portion of corporate net income attributable to business done within this state.

It is clear that no state may tax any subject over
which it has not jurisdiction. However, it is equally
well established that a state may tax that portion of a
multi-state corporation's income which is derived from
sources or activities within its boundaries. Shaffer v.
Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 40 S. Ct. 221, 64 L. Ed. 445; United
States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321, 38
S. Ct. 499, 62 L. Ed. 1135.
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KPnnecott 's major contention here is again predicatt·d on matters never fully asserted before the Tax
Commission hl'low. It is true that its petition below
as:wrted general commerce clause violations against the
att(lit dd"iciency. However, no where did it claim double
taxation as it now does on appeal.
'!'here can be no question that the application of the
formula of the Uniform Act is conditioned on a taxpayer
having taxable business activity both within and without
the StatP of Utah. See Sec. 59-13-79, U.C.A. 1953.
The question of when a taxpayer is taxable in another
state is the subject of Section 59-13-80, U.C.A. 1953
which provides:
"'For pmposes of allocation and apportionment
of income under this act, a taxpayer is taxable
in another state if ( 1) in that state he is subject
to a net income tax, a franchise tax measured
by net income, a franchise tax for the privilege
of doing business, or a corporate stock tax, or
(2) that state has jnrisdiction to subject the taxpayer to a net income tax regardless of whether,
in fact, tlw state does or does not."
Early in the proceedings below the Commission issued
subpoenas requiring the production of Kennecott's tax
in other states. (R. 74-76) The purpose of the
subpoenas was to disclose information relative to the
issues of the case and to determine whether there was
double taxation resulting from the proposed deficiency.
Kennecott moved to quash the subpoenas and refn;.;ecl to Drodnce the returns. The Commission did quash

!)2

the subpoenas m part, subject to the right to require
production of the returns and inquire into their contents, "should the taxpayer raise factual questions at
the hearing relative to whether or not the actual income
of the taxpayer for the years 1967 and 1968 has been
subjected to double taxation by any audit deficiency
which may be sustained by the Commission herein."
(R. 75)

As a result of quashing the subpoenas it was agreed
and represented by Kennecott that "although it was
subject to the trucing jurisdiction of other states, it did
not claim it was in fact subjected to a corporation income
or franchise tax on more than one hundred percent of
its income during the years 1967 and 1968." (R. 692)
On appeal Kennecott now appears to repudiate this
representation. On page 85 of its brief it argues that
although there is no evidence that if in fact paid taxe:;
on more than one hundred percent of its income, that
"actual double taxation is unnecessary from both snlistantive and constitutional viewpoints."
On Page 87 of its brief it states: "In the instant case
we are confronted with far more than the mere possibility of taxation by other States . . . there exists a
certainty that both California and Utah are taxing the
same income." (Emphasis added)
On }Jagt• 88 it claims that Kennecott, "is being
subje"ted to a three hundred percent direct tax on some
thirty-fom million merely for the fortuitous fact that
it is in interstate com11wrcP."
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'L'here is little or no justification in the record for
the facts asserted or implied for the first time by plaintiff on pages 83 to 88 of its brief. As such they are
not properly before the court and must be disregarded
in the
of this matter. Bradley v. Lewis,
!l7 Utah 217, 92 P. 2d 338.

In this regard Section 59-13-46, U.C.A. 1953, provides in part:
" ... Upon the hearing (in the Supreme Court) no
new or additional evidence may be introduced, but the
cause shall be heard upon the record before the tax
('OJmnission as certified by it . . . "

l- nder a similar statute this court was faced with
an attemvt to supplement the factual record in the case
of F!'rguson v. I11chtstrial Cornrnission, 63 Utah 112, 221
Par. 1099. It was there stated:
"This court has frequently held that in certorari
vroceedings the record certified up by the tribunal
to ·whom the writ is directed imports absolute
verity, and cannot be contradicted, or supported
by extrinsic evidence." 63 Utah 112, 114.
A;.:snrning, howeYe1-, for the purposes of argument,
that the facts Kennecott relies on in support of its claim
of donhk• taxation are before the Court, the Commission
nonetltc•less alleges that there is no double taxation
in this case.
Kt•1rneeott raises ·what it calls the "key constitutional
qnl'stion." Because the Commission claims it should
rP]mrt s011w thirt:·-four million dollars more as income

to Vtah than Kennecott allo<.:ated to Utah under the
Uniform Act, it asks "IS THERE ANYTHING WHICH .
WOULD PREVENT OTHER STATES FROM TAXING THAT THIRTY-FOUR l\IILLION." (PL Br. 8283) (Emphasis Supplied)
Kennecott then asks, "WHAT ARGUMENT COULD
KENNECOTT MAKE IN THOSE OTHER STATER•
TO PREYENT THEM FROM TAXIKG '1' HE
THIRTY-FOUR MILLION (Pl. Br. 83) (Emphasis
Supplied)

The answers to these questions would in all probability be found in the tax returns which Kennecott has ,
refused to produce. Absent their production, the Commission suggests that the solution to the rhetorical questions raised by Kennecott lies in the Uniform Act itself.
The Uniform Act presupposes that each state will
receive an allocated share of taxable income from a
multi-state corporation. Each state is entitled to tax
a pro-rata share of property, payroll and sales. These
factors are allocated to the states as fractions, the numerator of which is the value or amount of property,
payroll or sales in the taxing State, while the denominator is the value or amount of the same item everywhere.
Assuming that Section 59-13-92, U.C.A. 1953 (which
delineates the sales factor of the Utah Act) does not
allocates sales from the Utah Copper Division to Utah,
the Commission might reply, to which state are such
sales then allocated?
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The answer is that under the Uniform Act sales of
Utah Copper would be allocated in the denominator of
the sales factor in every state where Kennecott files
retnrns, but in the numerator of no state. 22 This does
not constitute double taxation. Even if the Tax Commission were to include one hundred percent of the
sales from Utah in the numerator of the sales fraction
(which it has not done) this would not constitute double
taxation because these particular sales would not be in
any other state.
Kennecott complains that it is being penalized for
conducting an interstate business. It says on page 88
of its brief that it is subjected to a three hundred percent direct tax on thirty-four million merely because it
is in interstate commerce.
This contention is belied by comparing the tax liability on the 1966 and 1967 returns. In addition, there
would be no allocation at all under the Uniform Act
if only intra-state business were conducted by Kennecott. In such event a hypothetical deficiency assessment
based on the same principles as the one sustained by
the Commission herein would result in a comparable
deficiency.
22For an example of how the other states might tax the sales in
question see Altman & Keesling, Allocation of Income in State Taxa- ,
tion, supra pp. 146-147 where it is suggested that New York would
not include receipts from sales of personal property in the numerator
of its sales fraction where the property was not located in New York
at the time the order was received or at the time the property was
appropriated to the order.
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As Kennecott has not seen fit to produce the records
which would prove the absence of double taxation and
as the Uniform Act does not authorize the imposition
of foreign state taxes on Utah Sales, the Commission
submits that Kennecott should not be allowed to allege
double taxation.
·
CONCLUSION
The allocation and apportionment provisions, Sections 59-13-78 through 59-13-97, U.C.A. 1953, do not
fairly represent the extent of Kennecott's business activity in the State of Utah. The Tax Commission has proposed a deficiency designed to more fairly allocate and
apportion such business activity to this State.
The deficiency assesment follows as closely as possible the prior decisions of this Court. It provides to
Kennecott such deductions as are authorized by law.
The Commission has not acted unreasonably nor
has it denied to Kennecott any rights to which it is
legally entitled.
The issue herein is not of self-restraint vs. greedy
maximization of revenue. Rather it is whether one of
the world's largest business entities is fairly allocating
its business activity to Utah when it reports in 1967
slight over four million dollars net income to Utah for
tax purposes while admitting a net income from the
Utah mine of over thirty-three million dollars in the
same year.
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The Commission submits that Kennecott's business
activity is not fairly represented on its returns and
urges that its decision be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
F. Burton Howard
Special Assistant Attorney General
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant

